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_______________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
_______________ 
 
SCIRICA, Circuit Judge 
 
  Defendants William E. Baroni, Jr. and Bridget Anne 
Kelly engaged in a scheme to impose crippling gridlock on the 
Borough of Fort Lee, New Jersey, after Fort Lee’s mayor 
refused to endorse the 2013 reelection bid of then-Governor 
Chris Christie.  To this end, under the guise of conducting a 
“traffic study,” Baroni and Kelly, among others, conspired to 
limit Fort Lee motorists’ access to the George Washington 
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Bridge—the world’s busiest bridge—over four days in early 
September 2013:  the first week of Fort Lee’s school year.  This 
scheme caused vehicles to back up into the Borough, creating 
intense traffic jams.  Extensive media coverage ensued, and the 
scandal became known as “Bridgegate.”   
 
In 2015, a grand jury indicted Baroni and Kelly for their 
role in the scheme.  Each Defendant was charged with seven 
counts:  conspiracy to obtain by fraud, knowingly convert, or 
intentionally misapply property of an organization receiving 
federal benefits, 18 U.S.C. § 371, and the substantive offense, 
id. § 666(a)(1)(A); conspiracy to commit wire fraud, id. 
§ 1349, and two counts of the substantive offense, id. § 1343; 
and conspiracy against civil rights, id. § 241, and the 
substantive offense, id. § 242.  A jury convicted Defendants on 
all counts.  They appeal only their judgments of conviction. 
 
For reasons that follow, we will affirm Defendants’ 
judgments of convictions on the wire fraud and Section 666 
counts but will reverse and vacate their civil rights convictions.   
 
I.1 
In 2010, then-New Jersey Governor Chris Christie 
appointed Baroni to serve as Deputy Executive Director of the 
                                              
1 Because Defendants were convicted at trial and raise 
sufficiency challenges, “we review the evidence in the light 
most favorable to the government.”  United States v. Hodge, 
870 F.3d 184, 204 (3d Cir. 2017).  The facts of this case are not 
materially in dispute. 
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Port Authority of New York and New Jersey.  That same year, 
David Wildstein—a cooperating witness in this case2—was 
hired to serve as the Port Authority’s Director of Interstate 
Capital Projects, in which capacity he functioned as Baroni’s 
chief of staff.   
 
Among its many functions, the Port Authority operates 
the George Washington Bridge, a double-decked suspension 
bridge connecting the Borough of Fort Lee, New Jersey, and 
New York City across the Hudson River.  On the bridge’s 
upper deck, twelve toll lanes carry traffic from New Jersey into 
New York.  During the morning rush hour, Port Authority 
police place traffic cones to reserve the three right-most 
lanes—the “Special Access Lanes”—for local traffic from Fort 
Lee.  This leaves the other nine lanes for drivers on the “Main 
Line,” which includes traffic from I-80 and I-95.  This practice 
of reserving Special Access Lanes was a decades-long custom 
dating back to a political deal between a former New Jersey 
governor and Fort Lee mayor.   
 
Wildstein testified he first became aware of the Special 
Access Lanes in March 2011.  He learned the three lanes were 
given to Fort Lee by a former New Jersey governor to reduce 
local traffic and “immediately thought that this would be . . . a 
potential leverage point with [Fort Lee] Mayor [Mark] 
Sokolich down the road.”  Joint App’x (J.A.) 1596.  Wildstein 
                                              
2 Pursuant to a cooperation plea agreement, Wildstein pled 
guilty on May 1, 2015, to an Information charging him with 
one count of conspiracy to obtain by fraud, knowingly convert, 
and intentionally misapply property of an organization 
receiving federal benefits, 18 U.S.C. § 371, and one count of 
conspiracy against civil rights, id. § 242. 
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shared this observation with Baroni, Governor Christie’s then-
Chief of Staff Bill Stepien, and Kelly, then the Deputy Chief 
of Staff for New Jersey’s Office of Intergovernmental Affairs 
(IGA).  Wildstein did not, however, use the Special Access 
Lanes as leverage at that time.   
 
Around the same time that Wildstein realized the 
Special Access Lanes could be used as leverage, IGA 
officials—including Kelly—were discussing a plan to solicit 
endorsements from Democratic elected officials to generate 
bipartisan support for Governor Christie’s 2013 re-election 
bid.  IGA officials rewarded potential endorsers with, among 
other things, “Mayor’s Days” (meetings with top departmental 
and agency staff) and invitations to sporting events, breakfasts 
and parties at Drumthwacket (the Governor’s Princeton 
residence), and the Governor’s State of the State address.  
  
The Governor’s Office and IGA used the Port Authority 
similarly to bestow political favors on potential endorsers.  As 
Wildstein explained at trial, the Port Authority “was viewed as 
the economic engine of the region” and “had an ability to do 
things for Democratic officials that would potentially put the 
Governor in a more favorable position.”  J.A. 1522–23.  Baroni 
and Wildstein were thus asked “to assist the Governor’s Office 
in identifying opportunities that would be helpful.”  J.A. 1523.  
The Port Authority gave benefits ranging from gifts (e.g., steel 
from the original World Trade Center towers, flags that had 
flown over Ground Zero, framed prints) and tours, to jobs, to 
large economic investments (e.g., the $250 million purchase of 
the Military Ocean Terminal at Bayonne).   
 
One Democratic endorsement sought by the Governor’s 
Office was that of Mayor Sokolich.  IGA invited Sokolich to a 
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New York Giants game, several holiday parties, and one of 
Governor Christie’s budget addresses.  And, as early as 2010, 
the Governor’s Office and IGA directed Wildstein to leverage 
the Port Authority’s resources to obtain Sokolich’s 
endorsement.  Sokolich received benefits ranging from the sort 
of gifts described above to substantial Port Authority 
assistance for Fort Lee (e.g., Port Authority Police assistance 
directing traffic in Fort Lee, a $5,000 contribution to the Fort 
Lee fire department for an equipment purchase, and over 
$300,000 in funding for four shuttle buses providing Fort Lee 
residents with free transport between ferry and bus terminals).  
Despite that, Sokolich informed IGA in 2013 that local 
political considerations precluded him from endorsing the 
Governor’s reelection bid.   
 
In June 2013, Kelly told Wildstein that she was 
disappointed Sokolich would not be endorsing Governor 
Christie, and Wildstein reminded her “if she want[ed] the Port 
Authority to close down those Fort Lee lanes to put some 
pressure on Mayor Sokolich, that that c[ould] be done.”  J.A. 
1605.  On August 13, 2013, Kelly sent an email to Wildstein 
that read: “Time for some traffic problems in Fort Lee.”  
Supplemental App’x (S.A.) 42.  Wildstein “understood that to 
mean it was time to change the lane configurations, the upper 
level of the George Washington Bridge in order to create traffic 
in the Borough of Fort Lee.”  J.A. 1612.  Wildstein testified 
that, on a follow up telephone call, Kelly told him that “Mayor 
Sokolich needed to fully understand that life would be more 
difficult for him in the second Christie term than it had been 
[i]n the first.”  J.A. 1620.  Wildstein admitted at trial that he 
agreed to change the lane configuration “[f]or the purpose of 
causing—of punishing Mark Sokolich, of creating a traffic jam 
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that would punish him, send him a message,” and that there 
was no other reason for the change.  J.A. 1621. 
 
Wildstein testified he told Baroni he “received an email 
from Miss Kelly that [he] viewed as instructing [him] to begin 
to put leverage on Mayor Sokolich by doing a lane closure.”  
J.A. 1618.  He also testified he told Baroni “that Miss Kelly 
wanted the Fort Lee lanes closed . . . [f]or the purpose of 
punishing Mayor Sokolich . . . [b]ecause he had not endorsed 
Governor Christie” and that “Mr. Baroni was fine with that.”  
J.A. 1623. 
 
According to Wildstein, he decided “to create the cover 
of a traffic study” and shared his plan with both Baroni and 
Kelly.  J.A. 1624.  Wildstein believed “calling it a traffic study 
would provide a cover story for the true purpose of changing 
and realigning that traffic pattern at the bridge” and “to have a 
public policy reason for doing so as opposed to saying it was 
political and it was punitive and revealing the true purpose.”3  
                                              
3 Baroni’s position at trial and on appeal has been that “[a]t no 
point did Wildstein tell [him] that the purpose of realigning the 
lanes was political payback rather than to conduct a legitimate 
traffic study.”  Baroni Br. at 14 n.4.  While “Baroni 
acknowledges that Wildstein’s testimony alone is legally 
sufficient to permit a jury to conclude otherwise,” he contends 
“Wildstein committed perjury at trial.”  Id.  We cannot discount 
Wildstein’s testimony—which the jury evidently credited—
“for it is the exclusive province of the jury . . . to decide what 
facts are proved by competent evidence,” and “also their 
province to judge . . . the credibility of the witnesses . . . and 
the weight of their testimony.”  Ewing’s Lessee v. Burnet, 36 
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J.A. 1632.  In furtherance of Defendants’ traffic study cover 
story, Wildstein contacted Peter Zipf, the Port Authority’s 
chief traffic engineer, and told him he wanted to take away the 
cones that created the Special Access Lanes “so that New 
Jersey could determine whether those three lanes given to Fort 
Lee would continue on a permanent basis.”  J.A. 1657–58.  
Zipf responded later that day with various proposals but 
recommended that at least one segregated lane be left in place 
to prevent sideswipe crashes. 
 
According to Wildstein, he and Baroni discussed when 
to implement the lane closure at the end of August 2013, and 
they selected Monday, September 9, 2013—the first day of 
school in Fort Lee.  But Wildstein waited to give the instruction 
until Friday, September 6.  He testified “[i]t was a deliberate 
effort on [his] part to wait until the last minute to give a final 
                                              
U.S. (11 Pet.) 41, 50–51 (1837); United States v. Caraballo-
Rodriguez, 726 F.3d 418, 430 (3d Cir. 2013) (en banc) (“[W]e 
‘must be ever vigilant . . . not to usurp the role of the jury by 
weighing credibility and assigning weight to the evidence, or 
by substituting [our] judgment for that of the jury.’” (quoting 
United States v. Brodie, 403 F.3d 123, 133 (3d Cir. 2005)) 
(omission and second alteration in original)).  But we observe 
that, in fashioning Baroni’s sentence, the District Judge applied 
a Guidelines enhancement for obstruction of justice, see 
U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1, in part because she found Baroni attempted 
“to mislead the jury in this case regarding [his] role in this 
conspiracy.”  J.A. 5678.  The trial judge concluded Baroni 
committed perjury at trial when he “continued to maintain the 
traffic study was legitimate when [he] clearly knew . . . that it 
was not.”  Id.  For similar reasons, Kelly also received this 
enhancement.   
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instruction so that nobody at the Port Authority would let Fort 
Lee know, would communicate that to Fort Lee or anyone else 
within the Port Authority,” including Executive Director 
Patrick Foye.  J.A. 1684.  According to Wildstein, he discussed 
waiting to give the instruction with both Baroni and Kelly, who 
agreed.  This directly contravened normal Port Authority 
protocol, with any lane closures announced to the public 
weeks, and even months, in advance.   
 
Wildstein gave the instruction to Zipf and two other Port 
Authority managers, Bob Durando (the general manager of the 
George Washington Bridge) and Cedric Fulton (the director of 
Tunnels, Bridges & Terminals), again claiming that New 
Jersey wanted to see whether the Special Access Lanes would 
remain permanent.  When Fulton asked if Foye knew, 
Wildstein lied and said he did.  Wildstein later told the same 
lie to Durando.   
 
Durando explained that because only one Special 
Access Lane would remain open, the Port Authority needed to 
pay an extra toll collector to be on relief duty for that sole toll 
collector.  Wildstein discussed this with Baroni and Kelly, and 
none of the three saw a problem with this extra cost.  Wildstein 
and Zipf also discussed collecting data on the ensuing traffic, 
and Wildstein testified he understood it would require “some 
staff time.”  J.A. 1688. 
 
On the morning of Monday, September 9, Port 
Authority police placed traffic cones two toll booths to the 
right of where they were customarily placed on the upper deck, 
thereby reducing the number of Special Access Lanes from 
three to one, and increasing the number of Main Line lanes 
from nine to eleven.  This realignment meant that Fort Lee’s 
Case: 17-1818     Document: 003113094594     Page: 10      Date Filed: 11/27/2018
11 
 
sole remaining Special Access Lane had to accept both cash 
and E-ZPass, further delaying traffic.  As discussed, Fort Lee 
received no advance warning of the change—contrary to the 
Port Authority’s standard procedures.   
 
 As a result of this change, cars attempting to cross the 
George Washington Bridge during the morning commute 
backed up into Fort Lee and gridlocked the entire town.  Mayor 
Sokolich repeatedly attempted to contact Baroni and IGA to 
have the two other Special Access Lanes reinstated, but Baroni 
deliberately did not respond.  Wildstein testified “that was the 
plan that [he] had come up with along with Mr. Baroni and 
Miss Kelly, which is that all calls would be directed to Mr. 
Baroni.  And that Mr. Baroni would be radio silent.  Meaning 
any—all the calls would come to him, and he wasn’t planning 
on returning any of them.”  J.A. 1687–88. 
 
 On the morning of September 9, Mayor Sokolich called 
Baroni’s office about an “urgent matter of public safety in Fort 
Lee,” but received no response.  S.A. 51.  The Fort Lee 
borough administrator also called to say Fort Lee police and 
paramedics had difficulty responding to a missing child and a 
cardiac arrest.  The next day, the mayor called again, saying 
the traffic was a “life/safety” issue and that paramedics had to 
leave their vehicle and respond to a call on foot.  S.A. 54.  
Receiving no response to his calls, he then sent Baroni a letter 
on September 12 detailing the negative impact on public safety 
in Fort Lee.  Kelly was similarly unmoved by the traffic and 
the anger it generated, reportedly smiling when a colleague at 
IGA informed her of the situation.  
 
 Executive Director Foye first learned of the realignment 
on the evening of Thursday, September 12.  The following 
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morning, he sent an email to Baroni and others, criticizing the 
“hasty and ill-advised” realignment and ordering the 
restoration of the prior alignment with three Special Access 
Lanes.  J.A. 1100–02, 5809.  Baroni went to Foye’s office and 
asked that the realignment be put back into effect, with only 
one Special Access Lane for Fort Lee.  Foye testified Baroni 
said the issue was “important to Trenton,” which Foye 
understood to reference the Governor’s Office.  J.A. 1107–08.  
Foye refused to do so.  Baroni returned to Foye’s office later 
that day, again asked that two of Special Access Lanes be taken 
away from Fort Lee, and said the issue was “important to 
Trenton” and “Trenton may call.”  J.A. 1109.  Foye held firm 
and continued to refuse.  Wildstein testified Baroni reached out 
to David Samson, the New Jersey-appointed Chairman of the 
Port Authority, to “overrule Mr. Foye and talk to others on the 
New York side,” but Samson ultimately declined to do so, 
instead recommending Baroni “let it go.”  J.A. 1832. 
 
 In response to significant public backlash, Baroni and 
Wildstein began preparing a report that would describe what 
happened as “a traffic study to determine whether it was fairer 
to give three lanes to Fort Lee.”  J.A. 1870.  The report would 
also have admitted that the Port Authority had failed to give 
Fort Lee appropriate notice due to an alleged “communications 
breakdown.”  J.A. 1870.  But the report was never released 
because Port Authority staff were asked to testify before the 
New Jersey State Assembly.  See J.A. 1879–80.  Wildstein 
helped Baroni prepare his testimony, which was based on the 
draft report and the traffic study and “fairness” rationale.   
 
 Then-Governor Christie fired Wildstein on December 6 
and Baroni on December 12.  Kelly was fired on January 9, 
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2014.  A federal criminal investigation followed and resulted 
in the underlying prosecution. 
 
II.  
 On April 23, 2015, a federal grand jury returned a nine-
count indictment, charging Defendants with seven counts each.   
 
In Count 1, the grand jury charged Defendants with 
conspiracy to obtain by fraud, knowingly convert, or 
intentionally misapply property of an organization receiving 
federal benefits.  18 U.S.C. § 371.  As charged, “[t]he object of 
the conspiracy was to misuse Port Authority property to 
facilitate and conceal the causing of traffic problems in Fort 
Lee as punishment of Mayor Sokolich.”  J.A. 96.  In Count 2, 
Defendants were charged with the substantive offense of that 
conspiracy.  The grand jury alleged Defendants, through Port 
Authority agents Baroni and Wildstein, “obtained by fraud, 
otherwise without authority knowingly converted to their use 
and the use of others, and intentionally misapplied property 
owned by and under the care, custody, and control of the Port 
Authority, with a value of at least $5,000.”  J.A. 119; 18 U.S.C. 
§§ 666(a)(1)(A), 2.   
 
In Count 3, Defendants were charged with conspiracy 
to commit wire fraud.  18 U.S.C. § 1349.  The charged “object 
of the conspiracy was to obtain money and property from the 
Port Authority and to deprive the Port Authority of its right to 
control its own assets by falsely representing and causing false 
representations to be made that the lane and toll booth 
reductions were for the purpose of a traffic study.”  J.A. 120.  
In Counts 4 through 7, the grand jury charged each Defendant 
with two substantive wire fraud violations.  18 U.S.C. §§ 1343, 
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2.  Count 4 pertained to Kelly’s August 13, 2013 email 
informing Wildstein it was “[t]ime for some traffic problems 
in Fort Lee,” and Count 6 to her September 9, 2013 email 
thanking Wildstein for confirming there would be “[r]adio 
silence” from Baroni in response to Mayor Sokolich’s 
inquiries.  J.A. 123 (second alteration in original).  Counts 5 
and 7 related to Baroni’s September 9 and 12, 2013 emails to 
Wildstein concerning complaints from Mayor Sokolich. 
 
In Count 8, the grand jury charged Defendants with 
conspiracy against civil rights.  18 U.S.C. § 241.  The charged 
“object of the conspiracy was to interfere with the localized 
travel rights of the residents of Fort Lee for the illegitimate 
purpose of causing significant traffic problems in Fort Lee to 
punish Mayor Sokolich.”  J.A. 124.  In Count 9, Defendants 
were charged with the substantive violation. 18 U.S.C. §§ 242, 
2.   
 
 At the outset, Defendants moved to dismiss all the 
charges.  See Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b)(3)(B).  The District Judge 
held oral argument and denied the motions.  After a six-week 
trial, the jury found Defendants guilty on all counts.  
Defendants moved for judgments of acquittal, see Fed. R. 
Crim. P. 29, and for a new trial, see Fed. R. Crim. P. 33.  Again, 
the trial judge denied the motions.  She then sentenced Baroni 
to 24 months’ imprisonment and Kelly to 18 months’ 
imprisonment.  Defendants, who are free on bail pending this 
appeal, challenge only their judgments of conviction.4 
                                              
4 The trial court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We 
have jurisdiction over Defendants’ appeal of their judgments 
of conviction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.   
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III.  
 Defendants challenge the sufficiency of the evidence 
supporting their wire fraud and Section 666 convictions. 
 
“We exercise plenary review over a district court’s 
grant or denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal based on 
the sufficiency of the evidence,” United States v. Willis, 844 
F.3d 155, 164 n.21 (3d Cir. 2016), and we apply the same 
standard as the district court, see United States v. Ferriero, 866 
F.3d 107, 113 n.4 (3d Cir. 2017) (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 
443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)).  “A judgment of acquittal is 
appropriate under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29 if, 
after reviewing the record in a light most favorable to the 
prosecution, we determine that no rational jury could have 
found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.”  Willis, 844 
F.3d at 164 n.21.  Where sufficiency arguments give rise to 
questions of statutory interpretation, our review is also plenary.  
See Ferriero, 866 F.3d at 113 n.4. 
 
A. 
 Defendants challenge the sufficiency of the evidence 
underlying their wire fraud convictions.  “A person violates the 
federal wire fraud statute by using interstate wires to execute 
‘any scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or 
property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, 
representations, or promises.’”  Ferriero, 866 F.3d at 120 
(quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1343).  Conspiracy to commit wire fraud 
is a separate crime subject to the same penalties as the 
substantive offense.  See 18 U.S.C. § 1349.   
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 The Government’s theory at trial was that Defendants 
sent emails in furtherance of, and to execute, a scheme to 
defraud the Port Authority of physical property (i.e., the 
Special Access Lanes and toll booths) and money (i.e., public 
employee labor) in order to carry out the lane reductions.  In 
summation, the Government explained this was the “same 
money, the salaries, the same property, the lanes, the toll 
booths,” that it alleged Defendants fraudulently obtained, 
knowingly converted, or intentionally misapplied in violation 
of 18 U.S.C. § 666.  J.A. 5195.  The Government explained: 
 
The physical property that was misused were the 
local access lanes, themselves, and the toll 
booths. . . . The defendants agreed to use these 
Port Authority assets, that property, to purposely 
create a traffic jam in Fort Lee.  That agreement 
was not a legitimate use of the George 
Washington Bridge, the Port Authority’s 
property.  
 
J.A. 5193–94.  The Government identified the “money” as “the 
salaries of each of the employees who wasted their time in 
furtherance of the defendants’ scheme,” including “the salary 
paid to the overtime toll booth collectors for the one remaining 
toll booth that was accessible to Fort Lee,” “the money paid to 
Baroni and Wildstein themselves while they . . . [were] wasting 
their time in furtherance of this conspiracy,” and “money paid 
to the engineers who wasted time—and Port Authority 
professional staff, who wasted time collecting data that no one 
ever wanted.”  J.A. 5194.  The Government also invoked the 
costs the Port Authority incurred in redoing a legitimate traffic 
study—at Center and Lemoine Avenues in Fort Lee—that was 
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spoiled by the gridlock and “would not have been ruined 
without these lane reductions.”  J.A. 5296. 
 
According to the Government, Defendants’ untruthful 
claim they were conducting a traffic study was what allowed 
them to carry out the lane reductions and to obtain the Port 
Authority property and money necessary to do so.  The 
Government also contended Defendants conspired with each 
other and Wildstein in furtherance of this fraudulent scheme.   
 
 Defendants argue the evidence was insufficient to prove 
a scheme to defraud because (1) Baroni possessed unilateral 
authority over Port Authority traffic patterns and any resources 
necessary to implement his decisions, and (2) the Port 
Authority was not deprived of any property right.  In addition 
to these challenges, Defendants contend the Government has 
disguised an impermissible honest services fraud case as a wire 
fraud case in an attempt to circumvent the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358 (2010). 
 
For reasons that follow, we hold the Government 
presented evidence sufficient to prove Defendants violated the 
wire fraud statute by depriving the Port Authority of, at a 
minimum, its money in the form of public employee labor. 
 
1. 
Defendants principally argue they could not have 
committed fraud because Baroni possessed the unilateral 
authority to control traffic patterns at Port Authority facilities 
and to marshal the resources necessary to implement his 
decisions. 
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They previously raised this argument in moving both to 
dismiss the indictment and for judgments of acquittal or a new 
trial.  Before trial, the District Judge declined to dismiss the 
wire fraud counts on this basis, holding the existence and scope 
of Baroni’s authority was a question of fact for the jury.  After 
trial, the judge denied Defendants’ motions because that 
question was “one that the jurors resolved in favor of the 
prosecution.”  J.A. 60.  Carefully reviewing the relevant 
witness testimony, the judge held “the Government presented 
evidence at trial from which the jury could reasonably have 
found that Baroni did not have the authority to change the lane 
configurations, and in fact, did defraud the Port Authority.”  
J.A. 59.  We agree. 
 
Defendants rely on our opinion in United States v. 
Zauber, 857 F.2d 137 (3d Cir. 1988).  There, the defendants 
were pension fund trustees who received kickbacks for 
investing in a mortgage company.  See id. at 140–41.  We held 
the indictment failed to charge violations of the mail and wire 
fraud statutes because it did not allege “an actual money or 
property loss to the pension fund.”  Id. at 147–48.  In so 
holding, we observed, among other things, that the defendants, 
“as trustees of the pension fund, had the power and the 
authority to invest the fund’s monies with others.”  Id. at 147.  
Likening Baroni to the pension fund trustees in Zauber, 
Defendants argue “the undisputed evidence showed that 
Baroni’s position as co-head of the Port Authority gave him 
authority to make unilateral decisions about the alignment of 
traffic patterns at Port Authority facilities, and to command the 
resources needed to carry those decisions out.”  Baroni Br. at 
42.  We disagree. 
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As a preliminary matter, Zauber is inapposite because 
here the grand jury alleged, and the Government proved at trial, 
that the Port Authority was actually deprived of its money and 
property.  In any event, the evidence refutes the notion Baroni 
possessed “unilateral” authority to realign the bridge’s lanes.  
To the contrary, it reveals Defendants would not have been 
able to realign the lanes had Baroni and Wildstein provided the 
actual reason or no reason at all.  They had to create the traffic 
study cover story in order to get Port Authority employees to 
implement the realignment.  And, as we described above, 
Wildstein lied to Port Authority officials Durando and Fulton 
about whether Executive Director Foye knew of the 
realignment.  This lie was necessary to keep Foye in the dark 
and prevent him from putting an immediate end to the scheme.  
In fact, that is exactly what happened when he finally learned 
of the realignment.  Foye ordered the three Special Access 
Lanes be restored to the use of Fort Lee motorists and refused 
Baroni’s repeated entreaties to reinstate the realignment.  
Baroni then appealed to Chairman Samson, who declined to 
intervene and overrule Foye’s decision.  This evidence belies 
Defendants’ assertion Baroni had anything approaching 
“authority to make unilateral decisions about the alignment of 
traffic patterns at Port Authority facilities.”  Baroni Br. at 42.  
If that were so, Baroni could have reinstated the realignment 
on his own without needing to appeal to Foye and then Samson.  
That Baroni was countermanded shows he lacked the 
unencumbered authority he claims he possessed, and that he 
needed to lie to realign the traffic patterns.  The record contains 
overwhelming evidence from which a rational juror could have 
reached these conclusions.  Indeed, it is difficult to see how any 
rational juror could have concluded otherwise.  The jury’s 
verdict necessarily reflects its rejection of Defendants’ 
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argument that Baroni possessed unilateral authority to control 
the bridge. 
 
Defendants contend we cannot draw this inference 
because the trial judge declined to give a jury instruction based 
on Zauber.5  We disagree.  The judge instructed the jury that 
                                              
5 Defendants requested the following language be added to the 
jury instructions: 
 
However, if an organization grants or bestows 
upon an employee the power or authority to 
control the organization’s money or property, 
and the employee acts within the bounds of that 
power or authority, then you cannot find a 
scheme to defraud.  Thus, if you find the Port 
Authority granted or bestowed upon David 
Wildstein or Mr. Baroni the power or authority 
to control the Port Authority money or property 
at issue here, and David Wildstein or Mr. Baroni 
acted within the bounds of that power or 
authority, then you cannot find a scheme to 
defraud existed. . . . Mr. Baroni and Ms. Kelly 
contend that the proof establishes that the Port 
Authority granted David Wildstein and Mr. 
Baroni the right to control the Port Authority 
money and property at issue here, which would 
prevent the existence of a scheme to defraud. 
 
J.A. 307 (footnote omitted).  The District Judge declined to 
adopt this language but told Defendants they were free to 
make this argument to the jury.  While the Government 
Case: 17-1818     Document: 003113094594     Page: 20      Date Filed: 11/27/2018
21 
 
[i]n order to establish a scheme to defraud, the 
Government must also prove that the alleged 
scheme contemplated depriving the Port 
Authority of money and property.  An 
organization is deprived of money or property 
when the organization is deprived of the right to 
control that money or property.  And one way the 
organization is deprived of the right to control 
that money and property is when the 
organization receives false or fraudulent 
statements that affect its ability to make 
discretionary economic decisions about what to 
do with that money or property.  
 
J.A. 5121–22.  This instruction forecloses the possibility the 
jury convicted Defendants of fraud without finding Baroni 
lacked authority to realign the lanes.  For Baroni could not 
deprive the Port Authority of money and property he was 
authorized to use for any purpose.  Nor could he deprive the 
Port Authority of its right to control its money or property if 
that right to control were committed to his unilateral discretion.  
In finding the existence of a scheme to defraud, the jury 
necessarily concluded Baroni lacked authority to order the 
realignment.   
2. 
 Defendants also argue the Port Authority was not 
deprived of any tangible property and challenge the 
                                              
argued the realignment was unauthorized, Baroni instead 
chose to argue he acted in good faith and did not know the 
study was a sham.   
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Government’s and District Court’s invocation of the “right to 
control” theory of property. 
 
 Before trial, the trial judge rejected Defendants’ related 
argument the charges should be dismissed because they did not 
“obtain” money or property.  Relying on our decision in United 
States v. Al Hedaithy, 392 F.3d 580 (3d Cir. 2004), the judge 
ruled “it [wa]s enough that they prevented the Port Authority 
from exercising ‘its right to exclusive use of’ its property, 
which here allegedly includes toll booths and roadways, in 
addition to money in the form of employee compensation and 
the costs of redoing a traffic study.”  J.A. 36–37.   
 
In their post-trial motions, however, Defendants raised 
no sufficiency arguments respecting the property at issue.  
Rather, they contended only that Baroni possessed the 
authority to realign the lanes.  We note Defendants arguably 
forfeited their right to raise these issues on appeal by not 
presenting them to the District Court.6  But we need not decide 
                                              
6 Nearly all our sister circuits have held that while a general 
sufficiency challenge is adequate to preserve specific 
sufficiency arguments on appeal, a defendant who seeks a 
judgment of acquittal on specific grounds forfeits on appeal all 
other grounds not specifically raised.  See United States v. 
Samuels, 874 F.3d 1032, 1036 (8th Cir. 2017); United States v. 
Hosseini, 679 F.3d 544, 550 (7th Cir. 2012); United States v. 
Chong Lam, 677 F.3d 190, 200 (4th Cir. 2012); United States 
v. Cooper, 654 F.3d 1104, 1117 (10th Cir. 2011); United States 
v. Graf, 610 F.3d 1148, 1166 (9th Cir. 2010); United States v. 
Herrera, 313 F.3d 882, 884–85 (5th Cir. 2002) (en banc); 
United States v. Chance, 306 F.3d 356, 371 (6th Cir. 2002); 
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that question because Defendants’ arguments are unpersuasive 
under any standard of review. 
 
The wire fraud statute proscribes “scheme[s] or 
artifice[s] to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by 
means of false or fraudulent pretenses.”  18 U.S.C. § 1343.  As 
Defendants note, the federal fraud statutes require the 
defendants to scheme to defraud a victim of “property rights.”  
See McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 359–60 (1987) 
(holding that the mail fraud statute is “limited in scope to the 
protection of property rights”).  Those property rights, 
however, need not be tangible.  See Carpenter v. United States, 
484 U.S. 19, 25 (1987) (“[Confidential business information’s] 
intangible nature does not make it any less ‘property’ protected 
by the mail and wire fraud statutes.  McNally did not limit the 
scope of § 1341 to tangible as distinguished from intangible 
property rights.”); United States v. Henry, 29 F.3d 112, 113–
14 (3d Cir. 1994) (“Carpenter made clear, however, that 
although a property right is required under McNally, it need not 
be a tangible one.”). 
 
                                              
United States v. Peña-Lora, 225 F.3d 17, 26 & n.5 (1st Cir. 
2000); United States v. Spinner, 152 F.3d 950, 955 (D.C. Cir. 
1998); United States v. Delano, 55 F.3d 720, 726 (2d Cir. 
1995); see also 2A Charles Alan Wright et al., Fed. Prac. & 
Proc. Crim. § 469 (4th ed. Apr. 2018) (“And if the defendant 
has asserted specific grounds in the trial court as the basis for 
a motion for acquittal, he or she cannot assert other grounds on 
appeal.”).  We have not squarely addressed the question and 
need not do so here. 
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Defendants argue they “did not deprive the Port 
Authority of any tangible property.”  Kelly Br. at 40.  “After 
all,” they say, “the Port Authority still owns all of the lanes and 
tollbooths (and always has).”  Id.  But even assuming arguendo 
Defendants are correct, the federal fraud statutes are not 
limited to protecting tangible property rights.  “[T]o determine 
whether a particular interest is property for purposes of the 
fraud statutes, we look to whether the law traditionally has 
recognized and enforced it as a property right.”  Henry, 29 F.3d 
at 115; see also United States v. Evans, 844 F.2d 36, 41 (2d 
Cir. 1988) (“That the right at issue here has not been treated as 
a property right in other contexts, and that there are many basic 
differences between it and common-law property[,] are 
relevant considerations in deciding whether the right is 
property under the federal fraud statutes.”). 
 
The Government introduced ample evidence 
Defendants obtained by false or fraudulent pretenses, at a 
minimum, public employees’ labor.  Their time and wages, in 
which the Port Authority maintains a financial interest, is a 
form of intangible property.  Cf., e.g., United States v. Pintar, 
630 F.2d 1270, 1282 (8th Cir. 1980) (“[T]here was evidence of 
concealment in connection with the diversion of employee 
services.  Assuming proof of fraud is necessary, this 
suffices.”).7   
Wildstein testified that, on the Friday before the lane 
reductions, he called Durando, the general manager of the 
George Washington Bridge, and said he wanted to study traffic 
                                              
7 As we will explain, it is well established that public employee 
labor is also property for the purposes of Section 666, which 
proscribes, inter alia, fraudulently obtaining property.  See 
infra III.B.1. 
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patterns and see the effect of taking two lanes away from Fort 
Lee.  Wildstein told Durando the New Jersey side of the Port 
Authority wanted to be able to “make a determination down 
the road as to whether those [Fort Lee] lanes would stay on a 
permanent basis.”  J.A. 1685.  Of course, as Wildstein admitted 
at trial, the traffic study rationale offered to Durando was not 
the real reason for the realignment.   
 
Among other things, Durando told Wildstein he would 
need to have a relief toll worker on duty because all of Fort 
Lee’s traffic would be going through one lane.  Wildstein 
testified he “understood that the Port Authority would have to 
pay for an extra toll collector to be on relief duty for that first 
toll collector,” J.A. 1686, and discussed this cost with both 
Defendants.  According to Wildstein, both Baroni and Kelly 
found it humorous that the Port Authority would have to “pay 
a second toll collector to sit and wait in case the first toll 
collector had to go to the bathroom,” and they had no problem 
with the extra cost.  J.A. 1687.  On Sunday, September 8, 2013, 
Wildstein emailed Durando to say he would “be at [the] bridge 
early Monday [morning] to view [the] new lane test.”  S.A. 49.  
Durando replied that he would also be present, and that he had 
“also brought a toll collector in on overtime to keep toll lane 
24 (the extreme right hand toll lane Upper level) in the event 
the collector assigned to TL 24 needs a personal.”  S.A. 49.  
Wildstein forwarded the email to Baroni.  On cross-
examination, Baroni admitted he had received the email and 
did not object to bringing in overtime toll booth workers.   
 
The Government also called Theresa Riva, a Port 
Authority employee who served as an Operations Planning 
Analyst for the George Washington Bridge during the relevant 
time period.  In that capacity, Riva supervised time keeping for 
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operations staff and managed scheduling and coverage for toll 
collectors.  Riva testified she learned of the lane reductions the 
Friday before, and Bob Durando “asked [her] to staff one 
additional toll collector” on the upper level toll plaza twenty-
four hours a day.  J.A. 2897.  Because toll collectors work 
eight-hour shifts, this meant “three toll collectors a day to be 
an excess toll collector in the toll house.”  J.A. 2897.  Riva 
testified all these additional toll collectors were paid an 
overtime rate “[b]ecause they either worked on their regular 
day off or in excess of eight hours, a double [shift].”  J.A. 2898.  
Riva testified these employees would not have been paid 
absent the lane realignment.   
 
In addition to the overtime toll workers, Wildstein 
discussed with Zipf using Port Authority professional staff to 
track data, which would include “numbers on how—how many 
cars were involved and how far back the traffic was delayed.”  
J.A. 1688.  Wildstein understood Zipf “would have to use some 
staff time.”  J.A. 1688.  At trial, the staff members testified to 
the significant amount of time they spent performing 
unnecessary work related to the realignment. 
  
Amy Hwang, Senior Operations Planning Analyst for 
the Port Authority, testified she collected data on traffic at the 
bridge and compared it to traffic on the same date the year 
before.  Hwang testified she spent two hours working on the 
traffic study per day from Monday, September 9, through 
Friday, September 13, for a total of 10 hours.  
 
Victor Chung, Senior Transportation Planner for the 
Port Authority, was asked to forecast the impact of reducing 
Fort Lee’s Special Access Lanes from three to one.  Chung 
testified he spent a little over eight hours doing this analysis on 
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the Friday before the reductions went into effect.  During the 
week of the reductions, Chung was asked to compare travel 
times approaching the bridge’s upper-level toll plaza during 
peak hours and to compare it to historical travel times.  Chung 
testified he spent about six hours on this analysis, for a total of 
14 hours spent on unnecessary work.   
 
And Umang Patel, Staff Service Engineer in the Port 
Authority’s Traffic Engineering department, downloaded and 
analyzed data relating to travel time on the Main Line during 
the lane reductions.  Patel testified he spent two hours 
discussing the lane reductions on Monday, September 9, and 
four hours per day analyzing data on Tuesday, September 10, 
through Thursday, September 12, for a total of fourteen hours.   
 
Moreover, Wildstein estimated he spent twenty-five to 
thirty hours working on the lane reductions, and that Baroni 
spent fifteen to twenty hours, for a total of forty to fifty hours.  
Their compensation is plainly “money” for the purposes of the 
wire fraud statute.8 
The Government’s evidence that Defendants 
fraudulently conscripted fourteen Port Authority employees 
into their service, and that Baroni and Wildstein accepted 
compensation for time spent conspiring to defraud the Port 
Authority, is alone sufficient for a rational juror to have 
                                              
8 As we will explain, Section 666 contains a safe harbor for, 
among other things, bona fide compensation.  See 18 U.S.C. 
§ 666(c).  That safe harbor applies only to that statute and does 
not affect our analysis of the money and property at the heart 
of the wire fraud counts. 
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concluded Defendants deprived the Port Authority of its 
money or property.   
 
Although we need not reach or decide Defendant’s 
arguments on the “right to control” theory9 in light of our 
holding, we recognize this traditional concept of property 
provides an alternative basis upon which to conclude 
Defendants defrauded the Port Authority.  As Baroni notes, 
                                              
9 Although each Defendant has fully adopted the arguments 
made in the other’s brief, see Baroni Br. at 2 n.1; Kelly Br. at 
4 n.1; Fed. R. App. P. 28(i), their positions on the “right to 
control” theory of property are in conflict. Baroni appears to 
accept as a background principle of law our precedent that 
“[i]ncluded within the meaning of money or property is the 
victim’s ‘right to control’ that money or property.”  Baroni Br. 
at 41 (citing Al Hedaithy, 392 F.3d at 601–03).  Kelly, on the 
other hand, argues at considerable length that “the theory that 
the Port Authority had been deprived of its supposed intangible 
property right to ‘control’ the use of its own ‘assets’ . . . fails 
as a matter of law.”  Kelly Br. at 40; see id. at 41 (“The 
Government has tried to sell this ‘right to control’ theory 
before, under far more egregious circumstances, but this Court 
did not buy it even there.”); id. at 42 (“In any event, whatever 
force the ‘right to control’ concept may have in the private 
sector, it cannot be imported to condemn a state official who 
makes regulatory decisions.”); id. at 45 (“The Government and 
the District Court invoked [Al Hedaithy] to support the ‘right 
to control’ theory. . . .  It is utterly inapposite here.”); id. at 46 
(“In fact, the ‘right to control’ theory is hotly contested among 
the Courts of Appeals.”).   
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“[i]ncluded within the meaning of money or property is the 
victim’s ‘right to control’ that money or property.”  Baroni Br. 
at 41 (citing Al Hedaithy, 392 F.3d at 601–03); see Carpenter, 
484 U.S. at 26–27 (holding “[t]he [Wall Street] Journal had a 
property right in keeping confidential and making exclusive 
use, prior to publication, of the schedule and contents of the 
‘Heard’ column” and that “it is sufficient that the Journal has 
been deprived of its right to exclusive use of the information, 
for exclusivity is an important aspect of confidential business 
information and most private property for that matter” 
(emphasis added)); Al Hedaithy, 392 F.3d at 603 (“[T]he 
deprivation in this case is identical to that asserted in 
Carpenter, i.e., the deprivation of ETS’s right to exclusive use 
of its property.”); 2 William Blackstone, Commentaries *2 
(describing “the right of property” as “that sole and despotic 
dominion which one man claims and exercises over the 
external things of the world, in total exclusion of the right of 
any other individual in the universe”). 
 
The George Washington Bridge is the world’s busiest 
motor vehicle bridge10  leading to our nation’s most populous 
city.  The Port Authority’s physical property—the bridge’s 
lanes and toll booths—are revenue-generating assets.  The Port 
Authority has an unquestionable property interest in the 
bridge’s exclusive operation, including the allocation of traffic 
through its lanes and of the public employee resources 
                                              
10 See George Washington Bridge, Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 
http://www.panynj.gov/bridges-tunnels/george-washington-
bridge.html (“The busiest bridge in the world, connecting 
northern Manhattan and Fort Lee, NJ.”) (last visited Nov. 8, 
2018). 
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necessary to keep vehicles moving.  Defendants invented a 
sham traffic study to usurp that exclusive interest, reallocating 
the flow of traffic and commandeering public employee time 
in a manner that made no economic or practical sense.  Indeed, 
the realignment—intended to limit access to the bridge and 
gridlock an entire town—was impractical by design. 
 
In sum, Defendants’ arguments concerning the property 
interest at issue fall far short. 
 
3. 
 Finally, Defendants argue we “should reject the 
government’s attempt to shoehorn a repudiated theory of 
honest services fraud into an ill-fitting theory of money or 
property fraud.”  Baroni Br. at 44. 
 
 In denying Defendants’ post-trial motions, the District 
Court summarily rejected this argument, holding “[t]here is a 
difference . . . between intangible rights to honest services not 
covered by the wire fraud statute, and intangible property 
rights which are.”  J.A. 60 n.15 (citing Carpenter, 484 U.S. at 
25, and McNally, 483 U.S. at 356).  We agree. 
 
 Defendants primarily rely on the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358 (2010), 
which narrowed the scope of the honest services statute, 18 
U.S.C. § 1346.  After the Supreme Court ruled in McNally that 
the mail fraud statute was “limited in scope to the protection of 
property rights,” Skilling, 561 U.S. at 402 (quoting McNally, 
483 U.S. at 360), Congress enacted Section 1346 “specifically 
to cover one of the ‘intangible rights’ that lower courts had 
protected . . . prior to McNally: ‘the intangible right of honest 
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services,’” id. (quoting Cleveland v. United States, 531 U.S. 
12, 19–20 (2000)).  That statute provides, for the purposes of 
the mail and wire fraud statutes, that “the term ‘scheme or 
artifice to defraud’ includes a scheme or artifice to deprive 
another of the intangible right of honest services.”  Id. (quoting 
18 U.S.C. § 1346).  In Skilling, the Supreme Court 
acknowledged “Congress intended § 1346 to refer to and 
incorporate the honest-services doctrine recognized in Courts 
of Appeals’ decisions before McNally derailed the intangible-
rights theory of fraud.”  Id. at 404.  But it also recognized a 
broad reading of the statute “would raise the due process 
concerns underlying the vagueness doctrine.”  Id. at 408.  In 
order to preserve the statute, the Court surveyed pre-McNally 
honest services case law, see id. 404–08, and concluded “there 
is no doubt that Congress intended § 1346 to reach at least 
bribes and kickbacks,” id. at 408.  Accordingly, the Court 
limited the application of Section 1346 to “the bribe-and-
kickback core of the pre-McNally case law.”  Id. at 409. 
 
Defendants argue it cannot be a crime “for a public 
official to take official action based on concealed ‘political 
interests.’”  Baroni Br. at 48.  And they warn that “[t]he 
government’s theory—that acting with a concealed political 
interest nonetheless becomes mail or wire fraud so long as the 
public official uses any government resources to make or 
effectuate the decision—would render the Supreme Court’s 
carefully considered limitation [on honest services fraud] a 
nullity.”  Baroni Br. at 48.  According to Defendants, “[i]t 
cannot be the case that the Supreme Court has pointedly and 
repeatedly rebuffed the government’s attempts to prosecute 
public officials for the deprivation of the public’s intangible 
right to honest services or honest government if, all along, the 
inevitable use of at least a peppercorn of public money or 
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property made every instance of such conduct prosecutable as 
money or property fraud.”11  Baroni Br. at 48–49.   
 
We are mindful of the Supreme Court’s honest services 
case law but do not believe it counsels a different result in this 
case.  Defendants were charged with simple money and 
property fraud under Section 1343—not honest services 
fraud—and the grand jury alleged an actual money and 
property loss to the Port Authority.  In any event, their conduct 
in this case can hardly be characterized as “official action” that 
was merely influenced by political considerations.  Defendants 
invented a cover story about a traffic study for the sole purpose 
of reducing Fort Lee’s access to the George Washington 
Bridge and creating gridlock in the Borough.  Trial testimony 
established that everything about the way this “study” was 
executed contravened established Port Authority protocol and 
procedures.  Indeed, witnesses testified that traffic studies are 
                                              
11 In passing, Defendants also contend their convictions raise 
First Amendment concerns because they represent “a criminal 
penalty for misleading political speech.”  Baroni Br. at 49 
(quoting United States v. Blagojevich, 794 F.3d 729, 736 (7th 
Cir. 2015)); see also Kelly Br. at 44 (“Moreover, given its 
implications for core political speech, this theory raises real 
First Amendment issues.”).  These arguments—to which 
Defendants devote a mere three sentences between their two 
briefs—have not been sufficiently presented or developed.  We 
agree with the Government they are waived.  See John Wyeth 
& Bro. Ltd. v. Cigna Int’l Corp., 119 F.3d 1070, 1076 n.6 (3d 
Cir. 1997) (“[A]rguments raised in passing (such as, in a 
footnote), but not squarely argued, are considered waived.”). 
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usually conducted by computer modeling, without the need to 
realign traffic patterns or disrupt actual traffic.  When traffic 
disruptions are anticipated, the Port Authority gives advance 
public notice.  And, as we have discussed, the evidence 
conclusively demonstrates Baroni lacked the authority to 
realign the bridge’s traffic patterns unilaterally. 
 
 It is hard to see, under Defendants’ theory, how a public 
official could ever be charged with simple mail or wire fraud.  
They appear to suggest that, as public officials, any fraud case 
against them necessarily entails intangible right to honest 
services.  That is not so.  As we have explained, Defendants 
were charged with defrauding the Port Authority of its money 
and property12—not the intangible right to their honest 
services.  Prosecutions of public officials for defrauding the 
government of money and property are unfortunately quite 
common.  See, e.g., United States v. James, 888 F.3d 42 (3d 
Cir. 2018) (former Virgin Islands senator charged with wire 
fraud and Section 666(a)(1)(A) violations for obtaining 
                                              
12 The trial evidence is sufficient to show Defendants deprived 
the Port Authority of much more than a “peppercorn of public 
money or property,” Baroni Br. at 49.  In any event, as the 
Government notes, the wire fraud statute contains no monetary 
threshold.  See 18 U.S.C. § 1343; cf. United States v. DeFries, 
43 F.3d 707, 709 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (“It is difficult to see where 
the defendants find this de minimis exception.  The [federal] 
fraud statute speaks only of ‘money or property’ generally, not 
of property above a certain value. . . .  Given the absence of 
any statutory hint of a threshold minimum, it is hardly 
surprising that several courts have found [the statute] 
applicable to what at first glance appear to be exceedingly 
small property interests.”). 
Case: 17-1818     Document: 003113094594     Page: 33      Date Filed: 11/27/2018
34 
 
legislature funds under false pretenses); United States v. Fumo, 
655 F.3d 288 (3d Cir. 2011) (Pennsylvania state senator 
convicted of mail and wire fraud for using state-paid 
employees for personal and political tasks in violation of state 
ethics laws); United States v. Bryant, 655 F.3d 232 (3d Cir. 
2011) (New Jersey state senator charged with mail fraud for 
fraudulently inflating pension eligibility through no-show 
jobs); United States v. Williams, No. 17-137, 2017 WL 
2716698 (E.D. Pa. June 6, 2017) (Philadelphia district attorney 
charged with mail and wire fraud for defrauding city and 
federal government of use of publicly owned vehicles).  
 
Defendants also argue their convictions pose federalism 
concerns and would “involve[] the Federal Government in 
setting standards of good government for local and state 
officials.”  Baroni Br. at 49 (quoting McNally, 483 U.S. at 360).  
Again, we disagree.  This case lacks the federalism concerns 
present in McNally, where the federal government prosecuted 
a Kentucky state official and a private citizen for their role in a 
“self-dealing patronage scheme” involving the state’s purchase 
of insurance policies.  See 483 U.S. at 352–53.  But unlike a 
typical state or local governmental body, the Port Authority is 
an interstate agency created by Congressional consent, see 
H.R.J. Res. 337, 67th Cong. (1922) (enacted), and Defendants 
acknowledge it receives substantial federal funding.  The 
federal government thus has an especially significant interest 
in protecting the Port Authority’s financial and operational 
integrity. 
 
*      *      * 
 In sum, the Government presented sufficient evidence 
for the jury to convict Defendants of wire fraud.   
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B.  
 Defendants’ other sufficiency challenge contests their 
Section 666 convictions.  In relevant part, Section 666 
provides: 
 
(a) Whoever, if the circumstance described in 
subsection (b) of this section 
exists— 
(1) being an agent of an organization, or 
of a State, local, or Indian tribal 
government, or any agency thereof— 
(A) embezzles, steals, obtains by 
fraud, or otherwise without 
authority knowingly converts 
to the use of any person other 
than the rightful owner or 
intentionally misapplies, 
property that— 
(i) is valued at $5,000 or 
more, and 
(ii) is owned by, or is 
under the care, 
custody, or control of 
such organization, 
government, or 
agency; . . . 
 
shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not 
more than 10 years, or both. 
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(b) The circumstance referred to in subsection 
(a) of this section is that the organization, 
government, or agency receives, in any one 
year period, benefits in excess of $10,000 
under a Federal program involving a grant, 
contract, subsidy, loan, guarantee, insurance, 
or other form of Federal assistance. 
 
18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(1)(A), (b). 
 Accordingly, a violation of Section 666(a)(1)(A) 
requires proof of five elements.  The government must prove 
that: (1) a defendant was an agent of an organization, 
government, or agency; (2) in a one-year period that 
organization, government, or agency received federal benefits 
in excess of $10,000; (3) a defendant stole, embezzled, 
obtained by fraud, knowingly converted, or intentionally 
misapplied property; (4) that property was owned by, or in the 
care, custody, or control of, the organization, government, or 
entity; and (5) the value of that property was at least $5,000.13  
See id. 
                                              
13 In this case, with the parties’ agreement, the trial court 
instructed the jury on these five elements consistent with the 
Third Circuit Model Jury Instruction: 
 
In order to find the defendants guilty of violating 
Section 666(a)(1)(A), you must find that the 
Government proved each of the following five 
elements beyond a reasonable doubt.  First, that 
from August through December, 2013, Mr. 
Baroni or Mr. Wildstein was an agent of the Port 
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 Defendants’ appeal involves only the third and fifth 
elements14—whether they obtained by fraud, knowingly 
converted, or intentionally misapplied Port Authority property 
(the actus reus), and whether that property was worth at least 
$5,000. 
 
As with the wire fraud counts, the Government’s theory 
at trial was that the property at issue fell into two categories: 
physical property (i.e., the Special Access Lanes and toll 
booths) and money (i.e., employee labor). 
 
                                              
Authority.  Second, that in the calendar year 
2013, the Port Authority received federal 
benefits in excess of $10,000.  Third, that the 
defendants obtained by fraud, knowingly 
converted, or intentionally misapplied Port 
Authority property.  Fourth, that the property 
obtained by fraud, knowingly converted, or 
intentionally misapplied, was owned by or was 
in the care, custody or control of the Port 
Authority.  And fifth, that the value of the 
property obtained by fraud, knowingly 
converted, or intentionally misapplied was at 
least $5,000. 
 
J.A. 5107. 
 
14 Defendants conceded that Baroni and Wildstein were agents 
of the Port Authority and stipulated that the Port Authority 
received federal funds in excess of $10,000 in 2013. 
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Defendants argue the evidence was insufficient to prove 
a violation of Section 666 because (1) that provision 
criminalizes theft, not the allocation of a public resource based 
on political considerations, and (2) the value of the property at 
issue was under $5,000. 
 
For reasons that follow, we hold the Government 
presented evidence sufficient to prove Defendants violated 
Section 666 by fraudulently obtaining, at a minimum, the labor 
of Port Authority employees in furtherance of their scheme, 
and that the value of that labor exceeded the statute’s $5,000 
threshold. 
 
1. 
Defendants broadly argue they merely allocated a 
public resource based on political considerations, which cannot 
be criminal.  Offering an analogy, Kelly contends Defendants’ 
conduct is “materially indistinguishable” from that of a mayor 
who, after a heavy snowfall, directs city employees to plow the 
streets of a ward that supported her before getting to a ward 
that supported her opponent.  Kelly Br. at 1.  Baroni makes 
similar arguments.  See Baroni Br. at 31 (“In any event, it is 
obvious that there is nothing illegal about allocating public 
resources to favor political supporters and allies.  Budgets are 
enacted, projects are funded, pork is doled out, potholes are 
filled, and snow is plowed at every level of government with 
political considerations in mind.”).   
 
While such analogies have some superficial appeal, we 
find them unpersuasive.  We agree with the District Court that 
this argument “conflates motive . . . with mens reas and 
conduct.”  J.A. 54.  Defendants altered the bridge’s decades-
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old lane alignment—without authorization and in direct 
contravention of Port Authority protocol—for the sole purpose 
of creating gridlock in Fort Lee.  To execute their scheme, they 
conscripted fourteen Port Authority employees to do sham 
work in pursuit of no legitimate Port Authority aim.  That 
Defendants were politically motivated does not remove their 
intentional conduct from the ambit of the federal criminal law.  
What Defendants did here is hardly analogous to a situation 
where a mayor allows political considerations to influence her 
discretionary allocation of limited government resources in the 
normal course of municipal operations.  There is no facially 
legitimate justification for Defendants’ conduct here. 
 
Nor are we persuaded by Defendants’ arguments that 
the Government has sought to expand the reach of Section 666 
beyond conduct involving bribery and theft.  Relying upon our 
decision in United States v. Cicco, 938 F.2d 441 (3d Cir. 1991), 
Defendants contend the Government is attempting to use 
Section 666 “to criminalize a public official’s efforts to 
allocate or reallocate public resources based on politics.”  
Baroni Br. at 24.  In that case, Cicco, a mayor, declined to 
rehire two auxiliary police officers because they failed to 
support the Democratic Party in a local election.  See Cicco, 
938 F.2d at 443.  The Government filed a multi-count 
indictment charging Cicco and a member of the town council 
with, among other things, violations of Section 666’s 
anti-bribery provision, 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(1)(B).  See id.  After 
the jury found the defendants guilty, the trial court entered a 
judgment of acquittal on the Section 666 counts, reasoning 
Congress did not intend for the statute to apply to their conduct 
and that it was unconstitutionally vague.  See id. at 444.  
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On appeal, we recognized Section 666, read literally, 
might cover the defendants’ use of municipal employment to 
solicit election day services as a form of quid pro quo, but that 
the statute’s language was “also consistent with an intention of 
focusing solely on offenses involving theft or bribery, the 
crimes identified in the title of that section.”  Id. at 444.  
Because we found the statute ambiguous, we turned to the 
legislative history.  Concluding “the crimes Congress targeted 
when it created § 666 are simply different in kind than those 
alleged” against the defendants, we held they did not violate 
the statute.  Id. at 445–46.  We also observed that the conduct 
in question—deprivation of public employment to solicit 
political contributions—was within the ambit of a different 
criminal statute, 18 U.S.C. § 601.  See id. at 446. 
 
The Government responds that Cicco is inapposite 
because the conduct at issue in that case “potentially implicated 
the bribery provisions of § 666(a)(1)(B), but has nothing to do 
with property obtained by fraud, converted or otherwise 
intentionally misapplied.”  Gov’t Br. at 38.  We agree that this 
case is not like Cicco. 
 
But Cicco is instructive here.  Our exposition of Section 
666’s legislative history—which was not limited to Section 
666’s bribery provisions—confirms that Defendants’ conduct 
in this case falls squarely within the statute’s purpose.  As we 
explained in Cicco, Congress enacted Section 666 as part of 
the Comprehensive Crime Bill of 1984.  See 938 F.2d at 444.  
We noted “[t]he provision was ‘designed to create new 
offenses to augment the ability of the United States to vindicate 
significant acts of theft, fraud, and bribery involving Federal 
monies which are disbursed to private organizations or State 
and local governments pursuant to a Federal program.’”  Id. 
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(quoting S. Rep. No. 98-225, at 369 (1984), as reprinted in 
1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3510).  We observed “[t]he Senate 
Report expressly notes that Congress wished the new statutory 
provision to be interpreted ‘consistent with the purpose of this 
section to protect the integrity of the vast sums of money 
distributed through Federal programs from theft, fraud, and 
undue influence by bribery.’”  Id. at 444 (quoting S. Rep. No. 
98-225, at 370, 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3511).  And “[w]e 
quote[d] extensively from the legislative history to illustrate 
that Congress intended § 666 to redress particular deficiencies 
in identified existing statutes.”15 Id. at 444–45. 
                                              
15 The legislative history reveals Congress intended for Section 
666 to augment two existing statutes, 18 U.S.C. §§ 641 and 
665.  Section 641, “the general theft of Federal property 
statute,” applies “only if it can be shown that the property 
stolen is property of the United States.”  Cicco, 938 F.2d at 445 
(quoting S. Rep. No. 98-225, at 370, 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 
3511).  As we recounted, the Senate Report explains: 
 
In many cases, such prosecution is impossible 
because title has passed to the recipient before 
the property is stolen, or the funds are so 
commingled that the Federal character of the 
funds cannot be shown.  This situation gives rise 
to a serious gap in the law, since even though title 
to the monies may have passed, the Federal 
Government clearly retains a strong interest in 
assuring the integrity of such program funds. 
 
Id. (quoting S. Rep. No. 98-225, at 370, 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
at 3511).  And while Section 665 makes it a crime for an 
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We have subsequently reaffirmed our understanding 
that Congress intended Section 666 to focus on offenses 
involving fraud and theft, observing “that Congress intended 
to expand the federal government’s prosecutorial power to 
encompass significant misapplication of federal funds at a 
local level.”  United States v. Willis, 844 F.3d 165, 165 (3d Cir. 
2016) (quoting United States v. Valentine, 63 F.3d 459, 463 
(6th Cir. 1995)).  We have also “not[ed] that courts have been 
wary of interpreting § 666 too narrowly” and that “the 
Supreme Court has repeatedly avoided constructions of § 666 
that would impose limits beyond those set out in the plain 
meaning of the statute.”  Id. at 166.  Although all of the relevant 
Supreme Court cases involve challenges to Section 666’s 
bribery provisions, their discussion of the statute’s text and 
legislative history validate our long-established understanding 
of the statute’s purpose and scope. 
 
In Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52 (1997), for 
example, the petitioner contended the Government must prove 
a connection between a bribe and federal funds to obtain a 
conviction under Section 666(a)(1)(B).  Id. at 55–56.  The 
Supreme Court disagreed, holding that Section 666’s bribery 
prohibition “is not confined to a business or transaction which 
                                              
agency officer or employee to steal federal job training funds, 
there was no statute of general applicability pertaining to theft 
or embezzlement by such individuals.  See id.  Thus Congress 
enacted Section 666, in part, to correct the deficiencies in 
these provisions.  “The goal was to protect federal funds by 
authorizing federal prosecutions of thefts and embezzlement 
from programs receiving substantial federal support even if 
the property involved no longer belonged to the federal 
government.”  Id. 
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affects federal funds.”  Id. at 57.  Relying upon the statute’s 
“expansive, unqualified language, both as to the bribes 
forbidden and the entities covered,” id. at 56, and “the broad 
definition of the ‘circumstances’ to which the statute applies,” 
the Court found “no textual basis for limiting the reach of the 
bribery prohibition,” id. at 57.  The Court held the statute was 
unambiguous on this point because it would “be ‘plain to 
anyone reading the Act’ that the statute encompasses the 
conduct at issue,” id. at 60 (quoting Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 
U.S. 452, 467 (1991)).  
 
 The Court next addressed Section 666 in Fischer v. 
United States, 529 U.S. 667 (2000).  At issue was whether 
Medicare payments paid to a hospital constituted federal 
“benefits” for the purposes of Section 666(b).  Id. at 669.  The 
petitioner argued the qualifying patient was the sole 
beneficiary of payments made under the Medicare program 
and that hospitals were merely being compensated for services 
rendered.  See id. at 676.  The Court disagreed, holding that a 
federal assistance program can have multiple beneficiaries, and 
that participating health care organizations were also 
beneficiaries under the Medicare program.  See id. at 677–81.  
The Court reasoned, in part, that “[c]oupled with the broad 
substantive prohibitions of subsection (a), the language of 
subsection (b) reveals Congress’ expansive, unambiguous 
intent to ensure the integrity of organizations participating in 
federal assistance programs.”  Id. at 678.  
 
Finally, in Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600 (2004), 
the Supreme Court addressed another challenge to Section 
666’s bribery provision.  The petitioner argued, inter alia, that 
Section 666(a)(2) could “never be applied constitutionally 
because it fails to require proof of any connection between a 
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bribe or kickback and some federal money.”  Id. at 604.  The 
Court disagreed, holding that the Necessary and Proper Clause 
gives Congress the power “to see to it that taxpayer dollars 
appropriated under [its Spending Clause] power are in fact 
spent for the general welfare, and not frittered away in graft or 
on projects undermined when funds are siphoned off or corrupt 
public officers are derelict about demanding value for dollars.”  
Id. at 605.  The Court thus held “[i]t is certainly enough that 
the statutes condition the offense on a threshold amount of 
federal dollars defining the federal interest, such as that 
provided here.”  Id. at 606.  To confirm its understanding of 
the statute, the Court relied upon the same legislative history 
we discussed extensively in Cicco: 
 
For those of us who accept help from legislative 
history, it is worth noting that the legislative 
record confirms that § 666(a)(2) is an instance of 
necessary and proper legislation.  The design 
was generally to ‘protect the integrity of the vast 
sums of money distributed through Federal 
programs from theft, fraud, and undue influence 
by bribery,’ see S.Rep. No. 98-225, p. 370 
(1983), in contrast to prior federal law affording 
only two limited opportunities to prosecute such 
threats to the federal interest:  18 U.S.C. § 641, 
the federal theft statute, and § 201, the federal 
bribery law.  Those laws had proven inadequate 
to the task.  The [federal theft statute] went only 
to outright theft of unadulterated federal 
funds . . . . 
 
Id.  Recognizing that the statute was intended to address 
offenses involving fraud and theft, the Court held that 
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“Congress was within its prerogative to protect spending 
objects from the menace of local administrators on the take.”  
Id. at 608. 
 
 Defendants’ reliance on United States v. Thompson, 484 
F.3d 877 (7th Cir. 2007), is also misplaced.  In that case, 
Thompson, a Wisconsin state procurement official, was 
prosecuted for steering a contract to a local travel agency, 
allegedly in violation of state procurement statutes and 
regulations.  See id. at 878–80.  The government’s theory had 
been that Thompson “‘intentionally misapplie[d]’ more than 
$5,000 by diverting it” away from the firm that should have 
been selected under the state’s procurement regulations.  Id. at 
880.  The Seventh Circuit was not convinced that Thompson’s 
decision actually violated the state’s regulations.  See id. at 
880–81.  And it observed that, unlike “[a]pproving a payment 
for goods or services not supplied,” her conduct “d[id] not 
sound like ‘misapplication’ of funds.”  Id. at 881.  
Significantly, the firm she selected was actually the low bidder, 
and “[t]he federal government saved money because of 
Thompson’s decisions.”  Id.  The Seventh Circuit turned to the 
statute’s caption—“Theft or bribery concerning programs 
receiving Federal funds”—because “the word ‘misapplies’ is 
not a defined term.”  Id.  Relying on that caption and the Rule 
of Lenity, the Seventh Circuit adopted a more narrow reading 
of intentional misapplication “that limits § 666 to theft, 
extortion, bribery, and similarly corrupt acts.”  Id. The Court 
further commented it did not believe a state official’s violation 
of state regulations and statutes—even if intentional—would 
violate Section 666 “unless the public employee is on the take.”  
Id. 
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 Thompson is distinguishable.  Thompson applied the 
state’s procurement regulations in a way that actually saved the 
federal government money and caused no loss.  Defendants, on 
the other hand, lied in order to obtain public employee labor 
from fourteen Port Authority employees.  They forced the Port 
Authority to pay unnecessary overtime to toll workers and 
diverted well-paid professional staff away from legitimate Port 
Authority business.  Their fraud is soundly within the scope of 
conduct Congress sought to proscribe in Section 666. 
 
We hold that, at a minimum, the Government offered a 
valid theory that Defendants fraudulently obtained, knowingly 
converted, or intentionally misapplied the labor of Port 
Authority employees, and that it offered evidence sufficient to 
sustain Defendants’ convictions. 
 
It is well established that public employees’ labor is 
property for the purposes of Section 666.  See, e.g., United 
States v. Sanderson, 966 F.2d 184, 189 (6th Cir. 1992) 
(concluding the defendant’s “theft of employee time [wa]s as 
much a theft of property as his theft of  [physical property], for 
the purposes of his section 666(a)(1)(A) conviction”); accord 
United States v. Genova, 333 F.3d 750, 758–59 (7th Cir. 2003) 
(affirming conviction under Section 666(a)(1)(A) where the 
defendant used public works employees for political labor); 
United States v. Delano, 55 F.3d 720, 729 (2d Cir. 1995) 
(holding indictment sufficiently detailed instance of theft of 
“the labor of [the defendant’s] employees”). 
 
We have explained, in addressing Defendants’ 
sufficiency challenge to the wire fraud counts, how they 
defrauded the Port Authority of the labor of fourteen public 
employees—eleven toll collectors paid overtime and three 
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professional staff members—in furtherance of the scheme.  
Those public employees spent hours doing work that was 
unnecessary and furthered no legitimate Port Authority aim.  
Defendants were able to obtain these employees’ labor only by 
lying about the purpose of the realignment, claiming they were 
conducting a traffic study. 
 
Defendants argue they could not have misapplied Port 
Authority employee labor because they did not receive a 
“personal pecuniary benefit.”  Baroni Br. at 27.  We disagree.  
Defendants had Port Authority employees do work they would 
not have otherwise done to further their personal scheme.  The 
fact Defendants sought to benefit politically, not monetarily, 
does not alter the fact they forced the Port Authority to pay toll 
workers overtime, and diverted the time of salaried 
professional staff, in furtherance of no legitimate purpose.  Cf. 
Genova, 333 F.3d 758–59 (explaining that “the point of the 
§ 666 prosecution is that political activities are not the 
performance of a garbage collector’s official duties,” and that 
while “Public Works employees were entitled to unpaid leave 
for political endeavors[,] the § 666 problem was paying them 
for that time”).  
 
Defendants argue this interpretation raises 
constitutional vagueness concerns.  We disagree.  At trial, the 
Government introduced evidence that, after Jersey City Mayor 
Steven Fulop declined to endorse Governor Christie, the 
Governor’s office directed state agencies (including the Port 
Authority) to cancel meetings with Fulop and otherwise ignore 
him.  In seeking to admit this evidence, see Fed. R. Evid. 
404(b), the Government argued there was no danger of unfair 
prejudice because “[t]he mistreatment of Mayor Fulop, while 
hardly reflective of good government, was not criminal and 
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thus, was less serious than the criminal conduct for which 
Defendants stand accused, conduct that needlessly imperiled 
public safety in Fort Lee and directly inconvenienced 
thousands of people.”  J.A. 259–60.  Defendants contend it is 
not clear why their mistreatment of Mayor Sokolich is 
criminal, but their mistreatment of Mayor Fulop was not, and 
that “[t]his inconsistency demonstrates the inherent 
arbitrariness of the government’s interpretation of Section 
666.”  Baroni Br. at 40.  Defendants again conflate motive with 
conduct.  While their decision to punish Mayor Fulop may 
have been animated by the same desire to exact political 
revenge, there were no allegations they defrauded their 
federally funded employer in order to do so. 
 
Defendants also raise federalism concerns, arguing the 
Government is improperly attempting “to police state and local 
officials in the conduct of their official duties.”  Baroni Br. at 
36.  As we have observed, Congress has a uniquely significant 
interest in safeguarding the Port Authority, an interstate agency 
created by its consent.  But we also believe federalism 
arguments are especially inapposite in the context of Section 
666.  We have described how Congress enacted Section 666 
specifically to bring state and local officials within the scope 
of the federal criminal theft law.  And as the Supreme Court 
has observed, “Congress was within its prerogative to protect 
spending objects from the menace of local administrators.”  
Sabri, 541 U.S. at 608. 
 
In sum, the Government presented evidence sufficient 
to prove Defendants fraudulently obtained, knowingly 
converted, or intentionally misapplied Port Authority 
employee labor in violation of Section 666(a)(1)(A). 
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2. 
 Finally, Defendants contend there was insufficient 
evidence to meet the $5,000 threshold because the Port 
Authority employees’ wages are exempt under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 666(c)’s safe harbor for bona fide compensation, and the 
Government quantified only $3,696 in toll workers’ wages.  
They also assert the costs the Port Authority incurred in 
redoing the legitimate Center and Lemoine traffic study cannot 
satisfy the $5,000 threshold because they were not aware of the 
study and the costs represent consequential damages, not the 
value of misapplied property.16  
 
The District Judge rejected these arguments, concluding 
“the Government introduced evidence that Defendants 
                                              
16 We note the jury was also instructed it could consider “the 
value of the affected real property, including the lanes and toll 
booths as measured by the amount of tolls generated during the 
lane and toll booth reductions.”  J.A. 5110–11.  In summation, 
the Government directed the jury to evidence demonstrating 
that the sole remaining Special Access Lane collected “well in 
excess of $5,000” during the week of the realignment.  J.A. 
5297.  Defendants did not challenge the sufficiency of this 
evidence in their post-trial motions and do not raise the issue 
on appeal.  And they concede “the lanes and tollbooths can 
qualify as ‘property’ for” Section 666.  Kelly Br. at 40.  This 
alone seemingly forecloses any argument the $5,000 threshold 
was not satisfied.  But because our affirmance of Defendants’ 
Section 666 convictions rests on their theft of employee labor, 
and the Government presented sufficient evidence the value of 
that labor exceeds $5,000, we decline to decide the issue.    
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diverted Port Authority personnel to do work that was not part 
of the agency’s ‘usual course of business’ when reconfiguring 
the access lanes,” and that “[t]he jury could reasonably find 
that the value of compensation paid to Port Authority 
personnel, losses from a ruined traffic study, and the value of 
the lanes and toll booths were not bona fide and satisfied the 
$5,000.00 threshold.”  J.A. 58.   
 
Without reaching the other costs presented to the jury 
(i.e., the value of the lanes and toll booths themselves, and the 
costs of redoing the Center and Lemoine traffic study), we hold 
the Government presented sufficient evidence that Defendants 
fraudulently obtained more than $5,000 worth of public 
employee labor. 
 
As to the cost of compensating overtime toll booth 
workers, the Government introduced, and Riva testified to, 
detailed payroll records showing eleven overtime toll booth 
workers were paid $3,696.09.  The Government presented this 
number to the jury on a chart and reminded them of the specific 
figure in summation. 
 
As to the value of the time of Port Authority 
professional staff, and of Baroni and Wildstein themselves, the 
Government also presented witness testimony and detailed 
payroll records.17  On the first day of trial, payroll records for 
                                              
17 In its brief, the Government asserts it “established that the 
lane diversion required $5,524.93 in pro-rated salaries of [Port 
Authority] employees to implement, and that is before the 
value of time Baroni and Wildstein spent on their mission to 
gridlock Fort Lee and cover up the reasons for that gridlock.”  
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the relevant Port Authority employees were admitted by 
stipulation.  These records indicate an hourly rate of $43.79 for 
Hwang, $52.11 for Chung, $47.24 for Patel, $79.59 for 
Wildstein, and $153.67 for Baroni.  Based on these rates and 
the hours Hwang, Chung, and Patel testified they worked on 
the sham traffic study, the evidence shows their time was 
valued at $437.90 ($43.79 x 10 hours), $729.54 ($52.11 x 14 
hours), and $661.36 ($47.24 x 14 hours), respectively.  
                                              
Gov’t Br. at 47 (citing J.A. 650–51).  In support of this figure, 
the Government cited its post-trial sentencing memorandum.  
That memorandum contains a chart quantifying, inter alia, the 
cost of labor provided by Hwang, Chung, Patel, the additional 
toll collectors, and Baroni and Wildstein.  The source of these 
calculations was unclear, however, because the chart contains 
no citations to the trial record. 
  
At oral argument, the Government explained the calculations 
were established at trial through Port Authority payroll records, 
which had been admitted into evidence by stipulation, and 
testimony from Hwang, Chung, Patel, and Wildstein about 
how many hours each had worked on the fraudulent traffic 
study.   
 
Following oral argument, we requested the Government to file 
a supplemental letter brief addressing, with citations to the trial 
record, the evidence it presented to the jury to establish the 
property subject to the Section 666 counts is valued at $5,000 
or more.  We further ordered the Government to attach any 
relevant trial exhibits or stipulations it had not previously 
submitted.  We also allowed Defendants to file a joint 
response.  The Government timely filed its brief, and 
Defendants filed a joint response. 
Case: 17-1818     Document: 003113094594     Page: 51      Date Filed: 11/27/2018
52 
 
Cumulatively, the three Port Authority traffic engineers 
provided unnecessary labor valued at approximately 
$1,828.80.   The value of the work done by Hwang, Chung, 
and Patel, taken with the $3,696.09 spent on overtime toll 
workers, satisfies the $5,000 threshold. 
   
Furthermore, based on Wildstein’s testimony about the 
amount of time he and Baroni spent in furtherance of the 
scheme, the value of their time was, at a minimum, $4,294.80.  
This figure reflects approximately $1,989.75 for Wildstein’s 
time ($79.59 x 25 hours) and $2,305.05 for Baroni’s time 
($153.67 x 15 hours).   
 
The Government reminded the jury of this evidence in 
summation: 
 
Based on Port Authority payroll records and 
testimony you’ve heard, about $5,000 in Port 
Authority salaries were paid for the time in 
connection for the lane reduction work 
performed by Tunnels, Bridges and Terminals, 
Miss Hwang, Mr. Chung, traffic engineering Mr. 
Patel, as well as for Mr. Baroni and Mr. 
Wildstein’s time spent to facilitate and conceal 
causing traffic problems in Fort Lee.  Those 
service[s] were wasted.  Those services were 
wasted for these lane reductions meant to punish 
the Mayor. 
 
J.A. 5295–96. Accordingly, we conclude the 
Government presented to the jury evidence sufficient to 
satisfy the $5,000 threshold. 
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 Defendants argue this compensation cannot count 
toward the threshold under the statute’s exemption for “bona 
fide salary, wages, fees, or other compensation.”  18 U.S.C. 
§ 666(c).  According to Defendants, “all of the Port Authority 
staff responsibly performed actual work, in good faith, for 
facially legitimate Port Authority purposes.”  Kelly Br. at 38.  
The Government responds this argument is “a red herring” 
because “Defendants fraudulently obtained and misapplied the 
services of [Port Authority] staff, not those employees’ 
salaries.”18  Gov’t Br. at 45.  “But the best way of measuring 
                                              
18 The Government made this distinction at trial.  In its 
summation, the Government argued: 
 
The defendants also agreed to misuse the time 
and the services of Port Authority employees.  
Those services have value.  They’re worth 
money.  And that’s Port Authority money.  The 
Port Authority money that was paid to those 
employees.  And because the Port Authority paid 
the salaries of each of the employees who wasted 
their time in furtherance of the defendants’ 
scheme to punish the Mayor.  And that includes 
the salary paid to the overtime toll booth 
collectors for the one remaining toll booth that 
was accessible to Fort Lee.  That also includes 
the money paid to Baroni and Wildstein 
themselves while they spent time wasting, 
wasting their time in furtherance of this 
conspiracy.  When they were suppose[d] to be 
working to advance the Port Authority’s 
interests.  And it includes money paid to the 
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the value of those services,” according to the Government, 
“was to calculate what portion of those employees’ salaries 
covered the time they spent unwittingly carrying out 
Defendants’ vendetta.”  Id.  We agree. 
 
Section 666(c) has no application to the services of the 
eleven overtime toll booth workers, Hwang, Chung, or Patel.  
The Government offered evidence Defendants fraudulently 
obtained those public workers’ services and labor; their 
salaries are merely a measure of the loss incurred by the Port 
Authority when it compensated those individuals for 
unnecessary, sham work.  See United States v. Valentine, 63 
F.3d 459, 465 (6th Cir. 1995) (holding “the plain language of 
[Section 666(c)] does not preclude prosecution” where there is 
“no allegation concerning [the defendant’s] own salary, nor the 
salary of others,” and “the government presented proof that 
[the defendant] misappropriated employee services”). 
 
 The charges involving the compensation paid to Baroni 
and Wildstein themselves are different, however.  The 
accusation is essentially that they did not earn their salaries in 
good faith by accepting payment for time spent defrauding 
their employer, so their compensation for that time could not 
have been “bona fide.”  Section 666(c) thus could apply to 
exempt compensation paid to Baroni and Wildstein.  “Whether 
                                              
engineers who wasted time—and Port Authority 
professional staff, who wasted time collecting 
data that no one ever wanted. 
 
J.A. 5194. 
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wages are bona fide and earned in the usual course of business 
is a question of fact for the jury to decide.”  United States v. 
Williams, 507 F.3d 905, 909 (5th Cir. 2007); accord United 
States v. George, 841 F.3d 55, 62–63 (1st Cir. 2016). 
 
 In this case, the judge instructed the jury that “[p]roperty 
does not include bona fide salary, wages, fees or other 
compensation paid or expenses paid or reimbursed in the 
ordinary course of business,” and that “[c]ompensation for an 
employee’s time and services obtained through deception is 
not legitimate or bona fide.”  J.A. 5110.  This instruction 
allowed the jury properly to exclude Baroni and Wildstein’s 
compensation under Section 666(c) only if it found they were 
both bona fide and paid in the usual course of business.   
 
 Because the jury in this case was provided only a 
general verdict form, we do not know how it determined the 
$5,000 threshold was satisfied.  The wire fraud convictions 
suggest the jury did not find Baroni and Wildstein’s 
compensation “bona fide.”  See Black’s Law Dictionary 210 
(10th ed. 2014) (defining “bona fide” as “in good faith; without 
fraud or deceit”).  But even if the jury determined Baroni and 
Wildstein’s compensation was subject to the Section 666(c)’s 
safe harbor, the value of the services of the eleven toll workers 
and of Hwang, Chung, and Patel—which was not subject to 
that exemption—was sufficient to satisfy the statute’s $5,000 
threshold. 
 
 In light of our holding, we need not address Defendants’ 
argument the frustrated Center and Lemoine traffic study is not 
cognizable property under Section 666. 
 
*     *     * 
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 Because the Government offered evidence at trial 
sufficient to prove Defendants fraudulently obtained the labor 
of Port Authority employees, and that the value of that labor 
exceeded $5,000, Defendants’ sufficiency challenge must fail. 
 
IV. 
 Defendants also challenge the jury instructions on the 
Section 666 counts and the District Judge’s refusal to instruct 
the jury it was required to find Defendants intended to punish 
Mayor Sokolich.   
 
Where, as here, a party has timely objected to the trial 
court’s jury instructions, we exercise plenary review in 
determining whether the jury instructions stated the proper 
legal standard.  See United States v. Shaw, 891 F.3d 441, 449–
50 (3d Cir. 2018).  “We must ‘conclude beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the jury verdict would have been the same absent 
the error’” for the error to be harmless.  United States v. Elonis, 
841 F.3d 589, 597–98 (3d Cir. 2016) (quoting Neder v. United 
States, 527 U.S. 1, 19 (1999)).  Our inquiry “is not whether, in 
a trial that occurred without the error, a guilty verdict would 
surely have been rendered, but whether the guilty verdict 
actually rendered in this trial was surely unattributable to the 
error.”  Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279 (1993).   
 
A. 
Defendants raise three challenges to the jury 
instructions on the Section 666 counts.  They argue we should 
vacate and remand their convictions because the District Judge 
erred in instructing the jury: (1) to consider the value of the 
Center and Lemoine study in determining whether the $5,000 
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threshold was satisfied; (2) that the Government did not need 
to prove Defendants knew of the specific property fraudulently 
obtained, knowingly converted, or intentionally misapplied; 
and (3) that “[t]o intentionally misapply money or property” 
means to intentionally use money or property “knowing that 
the use is unauthorized or unjustifiable or wrongful,” J.A. 
5109.  Because any error was harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt, we will affirm.  
 
1. 
 Defendants contend that, even if there is evidence 
sufficient to prove Section 666 violations, we should vacate 
their convictions and remand for retrial because the District 
Judge erroneously instructed the jury to consider the value of 
the Center and Lemoine traffic study.  Because we can affirm 
Defendants’ convictions solely on the value of public 
employee labor, we need not reach the Center and Lemoine 
study. 
 
 We have already detailed the trial evidence establishing 
the value of the public employees’ labor in addressing 
Defendants’ sufficiency challenge.  Our analysis there focused 
on whether the record, viewed in the light most favorable to the 
Government, provided a sufficient basis for a rational juror to 
convict.  But our inquiry here is different.  Defendants contend 
that, even if the record contained sufficient evidence that the 
value of public employee labor exceeded $5,000, we cannot be 
certain beyond a reasonable doubt the jury actually considered 
all of that time in light of its instructions.  We disagree.  No 
reasonable juror could have failed to credit the value of Port 
Authority employee labor Defendants used to effect their 
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fraudulent scheme, which alone satisfies Section 
666(a)(1)(A)(i)’s $5,000 threshold. 
 
Defendants do not assert any error in the jury 
instructions as to the value of the public employee labor, and 
we find none. The Government presented overwhelming and 
undisputed evidence—which we described in analyzing 
Defendants’ sufficiency challenge—concerning the amount of 
time Port Authority employees spent in furtherance of 
Defendants’ scheme.   
 
As to the cost of compensating overtime tollbooth 
workers, the Government introduced, and Riva specifically 
testified to, detailed payroll records showing eleven overtime 
tollbooth workers were paid $3,696.09.  The Government 
presented this number to the jury on a chart and referenced it 
in summation.  
 
The Government also elicited testimony from three 
members of the Port Authority’s professional staff—Hwang, 
Chung, and Patel—about the time they spent collecting traffic 
data on the realignment, in furtherance of no legitimate Port 
Authority purpose, and testimony from Wildstein about the 
time he and Baroni spent in furtherance of the scheme.  
Detailed payroll records reveal the value of the traffic 
engineers’ time was approximately $1,828.80. 
 
Defendants argue we cannot be confident the jury 
considered the traffic engineers’ time because it was not 
presented a full calculation of the value of their hourly rate 
multiplied by the hours they claimed to have worked on the 
sham study.  We disagree. The parties admitted the relevant 
payroll records by stipulation, the Government elicited 
Case: 17-1818     Document: 003113094594     Page: 58      Date Filed: 11/27/2018
59 
 
testimony to establish the number of hours worked, and it 
reminded the jury of this evidence in summation, estimating 
that the value of the engineers’ and Baroni and Wildstein’s 
time exceeded $5,000—which is correct.  The amount was 
over $6,000. 
 
Accordingly, the value of the work performed by 
Hwang, Chung, and Patel, taken together with the $3,696.09 
spent on overtime toll workers, satisfies the $5,000 threshold.  
The time Baroni and Wildstein spent plotting their fraud 
represents an additional $4,295. 
 
Because the jury was instructed “[c]ompensation for an 
employee’s time and services obtained through deception is 
not legitimate or bona fide,” and the Government presented 
overwhelming evidence Defendants fraudulently obtained Port 
Authority employee services, the jury necessarily found all the 
toll worker and professional staff time satisfied the $5,000 
threshold and was not subject to Section 666(c)’s exclusion for 
bona fide compensation.  As noted, even if the jury did not 
credit Baroni and Wildstein’s compensation, the value of 
employee time Defendants obtained nonetheless exceeds 
$5,000. 
 
Defendants’ convictions on the wire fraud counts 
confirm this conclusion.  The jury found Defendants defrauded 
the Port Authority and conspired to do so.  The only fraudulent 
scheme before them was one to cause a traffic blockage in Fort 
Lee by conducting a sham traffic study.  There is 
overwhelming evidence that the bridge lanes were altered, 
eleven toll collectors worked additional overtime hours as a 
result, and the traffic study was conducted with the help of 
several well-paid Port Authority engineers.  Defendants do not 
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argue the study was not conducted.  At trial, they asserted they 
did not know it was a sham or barely participated in it—an 
argument the jury roundly rejected. Indeed, the jury was 
instructed that, if it found the Defendants believed the traffic 
study was legitimate, it was a complete defense.  On appeal, 
they argue Baroni had the authority to conduct the study even 
if it was a sham.  The jury could not have concluded that 
Defendants conspired to conduct a sham traffic study but then 
ignored the value of the employee labor necessary to effect that 
fraudulent scheme.  As we have explained, the jury was 
presented with overwhelming and undisputed evidence 
demonstrating the value of the toll workers’ and professional 
staff’s time exceeds $5,000. 
 
2. 
Next, Defendants contend the District Court erred in 
instructing the jury it did not need to know of the specific 
property obtained.  Defendants raise this argument to challenge 
the inclusion of the Center and Lemoine study in the jury 
instructions.  Although we agree the instruction was erroneous, 
the error was harmless. 
 
The District Judge instructed the jury: 
The Government does not have to prove that the 
Defendants knew of the specific property 
obtained by fraud, knowingly converted, or 
intentionally misapplied, or that the value of the 
property met or exceeded $5,000. 
 
J.A. 5110.  This addition to the Third Circuit’s Model Jury 
Instruction was proposed by the Government. In proposed draft 
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jury instructions submitted to the trial court, the Government 
“propose[d] keeping [this] language” on the following basis: 
 
As this Court recognized in denying Defendants’ 
motions to dismiss the Indictment, the $5,000 
requirement is a “jurisdictional element.” United 
States v. Baroni, Crim. No. 15-193, 2016 WL 
3388302, at *7 (D.N.J. June 13, 2016) (citing 
United States v. Briston, 192 F. App’x 84, 85 (3d 
Cir. 2006)).  The Third Circuit has long held that 
a defendant’s “knowledge of . . . jurisdictional 
fact[s]” is “irrelevant.”  United States v. 
Crutchley, 502 F.2d 1195, 1201 (3d Cir. 1974); 
see also United States v. Moyer, 674 F.3d 192, 
208 (3d Cir. 2012) (“[i]t is well settled that mens 
rea requirements typically do not extend to the 
jurisdictional elements of a crime”) (quotation 
omitted). 
 
J.A. 495.  At the charging conference, Defendants objected to 
this addition and requested the judge instruct the jury it had to 
be “at least reasonably foreseeable what property would be 
obtained.”  J.A. 4993.  The Government responded that 
“[r]easonably foreseeable goes to mens rea, which the Third 
Circuit has held clearly does not extend to the jurisdictional 
elements of statutes like 666.”  J.A. 4993.  The judge agreed 
and declined to instruct the jury the property at issue had to be 
reasonably foreseeable to Defendants.  J.A. 4994. 
 
Defendants argue this was error because the “Section 
666’s jurisdictional element is the requirement that the victim 
be a federal program beneficiary,” and that “[t]he $5,000 
threshold is a de minimis exception, below which Congress 
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simply chose not to authorize prosecution.”  Baroni Br. at 73; 
see Fischer, 529 U.S. at 682 (Thomas, J., dissenting) 
(describing “[t]he jurisdictional provision of 18 U.S.C. § 
666(b)”).  We agree Section 666(b) is the statute’s 
jurisdictional provision in the sense that this provision provides 
the jurisdictional hook “tying the proscribed conduct to the 
area of federal concern delineated by the statute,” United States 
v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671, 695 (1975), here Congress’s Spending 
Clause power, see Sabri, 541 U.S. at 605.  But Section 
666(a)(1)(A)(i)’s requirement that the value of affected 
property be at least $5,000 can be described as jurisdictional in 
the sense that it is a “jurisdictional floor” below which 
Congress has determined there is insufficient federal interest in 
prosecution. 
 
In any event, the affected property is not part of Section 
666(a)(1)(A)(i)’s $5,000 requirement.  That provision requires 
only that the property “is valued at $5,000 or more.”  18 U.S.C. 
§ 666(a)(1)(A)(i).  The property is the direct object of the 
conduct element, Section 666(a)(1)(A), which provides that 
one who “embezzles, steals, obtains by fraud, or otherwise 
without authority knowingly converts to the use of any person 
other than the rightful owner or intentionally misapplies, 
property” violates the statute.  Id. § 666(a)(1)(A). 
 
While the jury need not have found that Defendants 
knew the value of the property, it was error for the trial judge 
to instruct the jury “[t]he Government d[id] not have to prove 
that the Defendants knew of the specific property obtained by 
fraud, knowingly converted, or intentionally misapplied.”  J.A. 
495.  Such an instruction runs the risk of negating the statute’s 
mens rea requirement and thus relieving the Government of its 
burden of proof on an essential element of the crime.  We do 
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not believe, for example, one could intend to misapply 
something one does not know exists; to instruct the jury 
otherwise would seemingly dispense with the intent 
requirement.   
 
But because we need not reach nor credit the Center and 
Lemoine study to affirm Defendants’ convictions, the error 
was harmless.  There is overwhelming evidence Defendants 
knew of the property fraudulently obtained or intentionally 
misapplied, including the work of fourteen of Baroni’s 
subordinates at the Port Authority. 
 
3. 
 Defendants next challenge the District Judge’s 
definition of intentional misapplication as ambiguous.  We 
disagree.  Following the Third Circuit Model Jury Instruction, 
the judge instructed the jury: 
 
To intentionally misapply money or property 
means to intentionally use money or property of 
the Port Authority knowing that the use is 
unauthorized or unjustifiable or wrongful.  
Misapplication includes the wrongful use of the 
money or property for an unauthorized purpose, 
even if the use actually benefitted the Port 
Authority.  
 
J.A. 5109.  Defendants argue that “unjustifiable or wrongful” 
is overbroad and ambiguous.  Defendants raised this same 
argument in pretrial motions and at the charging conference.  
The Government responded these are common terms and have 
been used in numerous intentional misapplication cases going 
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back decades.  Kelly’s lawyer suggested that the judge “just 
define what unjustifiable and wrongful are,” but when asked 
for proposed definitions, had nothing to offer.  J.A. 4992.  The 
judge overruled Defendants’ objection because the terms are 
not “inherently vague” and were not “strong legal term[s].”  
J.A. 4992. 
 
 On appeal, Defendants argue these terms are so broad 
that the jury could have convicted if it believed the lane 
realignment was “a bad idea,” unjustifiable “as a policy 
matter,” or that Baroni should have sought Executive Director 
Foye’s approval.  Kelly Br. at 35 (emphasis omitted).  We 
disagree. 
 
 Other instructions in the District Judge’s thorough and 
comprehensive charge foreclose the possibility the jury 
convicted defendants for lawful but imprudent conduct, e.g., 
because the jury thought the lane reductions were “a bad idea.”  
These include the requirement that $5,000 worth of property 
be stolen or misapplied and that the misapplication be “for an 
unauthorized purpose.”  The judge also told the jury that it had 
to be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the purpose of 
the lane reductions was not a legitimate traffic study and that 
Defendants’ good faith would be a complete defense to the 
charges.  See J.A. 5141–42.  Because the jury was instructed 
that Defendants could not be convicted if they believed in good 
faith that the reductions were part of a legitimate traffic study, 
a jury following its instructions could not have convicted 
Defendants based on its personal judgments about the wisdom 
and execution of the traffic study.  
 
 Moreover, we observe that this definition, or even 
broader language, is contained in the model jury instructions in 
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several of our sister circuits.  It is included verbatim in the 
Section 666 pattern jury instructions from the Eighth Circuit.  
8th Cir. Model. Crim. Jury Instr. § 6.18.666A.  The First 
Circuit’s 18 U.S.C. § 656 (theft, embezzlement, or 
misapplication by bank officer or employee) pattern 
instructions define “willful misapplication” to include “that 
[defendants] wrongfully used the bank’s funds” without further 
clarifying what “wrongfully” means.  1st Cir. Model. Crim. 
Jury Instr. § 4.18.656. The Ninth and Tenth Circuits both have 
pattern instructions for statutes containing “willful 
misapplication” that do not define those terms at all.  See 9th 
Cir. Model. Crim. Jury Instr. § 8.41; 10th Cir. Model Crim. 
Jury Instr. § 2.32.  Jurors are regularly trusted to understand the 
meaning of these ordinary words in criminal cases. 
 
B. 
 Defendants also challenge the District Judge’s refusal to 
instruct the jury it needed to find Defendants intended to 
punish Mayor Sokolich in order to convict.  They contend this 
error affects every count and constructively amended the 
indictment, “permit[ing] the jury to convict based on conduct 
that was not unlawful.”  Baroni Br. at 63.  We disagree. 
 
 Defendants requested the object of the conspiracy be 
defined throughout the jury charge as one “to misuse Port 
Authority property to facilitate and conceal the causing of 
traffic problems in Fort Lee as punishment of Mayor 
Sokolich.”  E.g., J.A. 501–04, 506.  The trial court disagreed, 
ruling “the purpose or the object of the conspiracy being to 
punish Mayor Sokolich goes to motive,” which is “not an 
element of the crime” and so “not an element that has to be 
proven.”  J.A. 5009.    
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 During deliberations, the jury sent a note asking:  “Can 
you be guilty of conspiracy without the act being intentionally 
punative [sic] toward Mayor Socholich [sic].”  J.A. 648.  The 
judge responded:  “Yes.  Please consider this along with all 
other instructions that have been given to you.”  J.A. 648. 
 
 In their post-trial motions, Defendants argued the 
punishment of Mayor Sokolich was “an essential element of 
each of the charged offenses,” and that the failure to instruct 
the jury on this point relieved the Government of its burden of 
proof.  J.A. 50.  The trial judge again disagreed, explaining that 
“any punitive goal Defendants may have had goes to their 
motive for violating the charged statutes, [but] is not an 
essential element of any of the crimes charged.”  J.A. 50.  We 
agree. 
 
 Defendants argue the “intent to punish Sokolich [is] an 
essential element of the mens rea of the charged offenses.”  
Baroni Br. at 58.  Once again, Defendants conflate motive with 
mens rea intent and conduct.  As we recently explained in 
Hassan v. City of New York: 
 
[T]here’s a difference between “intent” and 
“motive.”  “[A] defendant acts intentionally 
when he desires a particular result, without 
reference to the reason for such desire.  Motive, 
on the other hand, is the reason why the 
defendant desires the result.”  2 Harry Sanger 
Richards et al., American Law and Procedure § 
8, at 6 (1922).  In other words, “intent” asks 
whether a person acts “intentionally or 
accidentally,” while “motive” asks, “If he did it 
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intentionally, why did he do it?”  1 John William 
Salmond, Jurisprudence § 134, at 398 (7th 
ed.1924) (emphasis in original); see also Black's 
Law Dictionary 881 (Bryan Garner ed., 10th ed. 
2014) (“While motive is the inducement to do 
some act, intent is the mental resolution or 
determination to do it.”).  This fundamental 
“distinction between motive and intent runs all 
through the law.”  Johnson v. Phelan, 69 F.3d 
144, 155 (7th Cir.1995) (Posner, C.J., concurring 
in part and dissenting in part). 
 
804 F.3d 277, 297 (3d Cir. 2015). 
The District Judge properly instructed the jury, for 
example, that to find Defendants guilty of wire fraud, the 
Government was required to prove they “knowingly devised a 
scheme to defraud or to obtain money or property by materially 
false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises,” 
and that they “acted with intent to defraud.”  J.A. 5119.  This 
describes the conduct proscribed by the statute and the required 
mens rea.  The intent to punish Mayor Sokolich may explain 
Defendants’ motive—why Defendants intended to defraud the 
Port Authority in this case—but it is distinct from mens rea and 
is not a required element of any of the charged offenses.  See, 
e.g., Pointer v. United States, 151 U.S. 396, 417 (1894) (“The 
absence of evidence suggesting a motive for the commission 
of the crime charged is a circumstance in favor of the accused, 
to be given such weight as the jury deems proper; but proof of 
motive is never indispensable to conviction.”); United States v. 
Sriyuth, 98 F.3d 739, 747 n.12 (3d Cir. 1996) (“[M]otive is 
always relevant in a criminal case, even if it is not an element 
of the crime.”); cf. United States v. Davis, 183 F.3d 231, 244 
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(3d Cir. 1999) (“It is clear that the parties involved in this 
intrigue had different motives. . . .  Davis contends that this 
disproves a conspiracy.  We disagree.  If they all agreed to 
interfere with a pending judicial proceeding, they are guilty 
of conspiracy.  That is the difference between motive and 
intent.”); United States v. Harrison, 942 F.2d 751, 756 (10th 
Cir. 1991) (“The goals of all the participants need not be 
congruent for a single conspiracy to exists, so long as their 
goals are not at cross purposes.” (quoting United States v. 
Maldonado-Rivera, 922 F.2d 934, 963 (2d Cir. 1990))). 
 
Indeed, following the Third Circuit Model Jury 
Instructions, the District Judge charged the jury on this critical 
difference between motive and intent: 
 
Intent and motive are different concepts. Motive 
is what prompts a person to act.  Intent refers 
only to the state of mind with which the 
particular act is done.  Personal advancement and 
financial gain, for example, are motives for much 
of human conduct.  However, these motives may 
prompt one person to intentionally do something 
perfectly acceptable, while prompting another 
person to intentionally do an act that is a crime.  
Motive is not an element of the offense with 
which a defendant is charged.  Proof of bad 
motive is not required to convict.  Further, proof 
of bad motive alone does not establish that the 
defendant is guilty.  And proof of good motive 
alone does not establish that the defendant is not 
guilty.  Evidence of the defendant’s motive may, 
however, help you to determine his or her intent. 
 
Case: 17-1818     Document: 003113094594     Page: 68      Date Filed: 11/27/2018
69 
 
J.A. 5139; 3d Cir. Model. Crim. Jury Instr. § 5.04.  The judge 
specifically instructed the jury that evidence of motive may be 
relevant to establishing mens rea, thus allowing a juror who 
found evidence of motive lacking to vote for acquittal.  
Defendants were free to argue—and did argue—that they were 
not motivated by any desire to punish Mayor Sokolich.  The 
jury’s guilty verdict necessarily demonstrates no juror found 
motive so lacking as to raise a reasonable doubt concerning 
Defendants’ guilt.  Moreover, as we have explained, the 
comprehensive and thorough jury charge created no risk that 
Defendants were convicted on the basis of lawful conduct.   
 
And while the grand jury included language describing 
Defendants’ motive to punish the mayor in the indictment, that 
language—which did not describe an essential element of the 
charged offense—was merely surplusage.  Because the jury 
instructions did not modify the essential elements of the 
offenses as charged in the indictment, there was no 
constructive amendment.  See United States v. Repak, 852 F.3d 
230, 257–58 (3d Cir. 2017) (“An indictment is constructively 
amended when, in the absence of a formal amendment, the 
evidence and jury instructions at trial modify essential terms of 
the charged offense in such a way that there is a substantial 
likelihood that the jury may have convicted the defendant for 
an offense differing from the offense the indictment returned 
by the grand jury actually charged.” (quoting United States v. 
Daraio, 445 F.3d 253, 259–60 (3d Cir. 2006))). 
 
Accordingly, we find no error in these instructions or 
the District Judge’s response to the jury’s question. 
 
*      *      * 
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Because Defendants’ sufficiency challenges to their 
wire fraud and Section 666 offenses fail, and because we find 
any error in the jury instructions was at worst harmless, we will 
affirm Defendants’ judgments of convictions as to the wire 
fraud and Section 666 offenses.  We now turn to the civil rights 
counts. 
 
V. 
Finally, Defendants challenge the sufficiency of Counts 
8 and 9 of the indictment.   In those counts, the grand jury 
charged Defendants with conspiring to violate, and 
substantively violating, the civil rights of Fort Lee residents.  It 
alleged “[t]he object of the conspiracy was to interfere with the 
localized travel rights of the residents of Fort Lee for the 
illegitimate purpose of causing significant traffic problems in 
Fort Lee to punish Mayor Sokolich,” J.A. 124, and that 
Defendants “knowingly and willfully deprived the residents of 
Fort Lee of the rights, privileges, and immunities secured by 
the Constitution and laws of the United States, namely, the 
right to localized travel on public roadways free from 
restrictions unrelated to legitimate government objectives,” 
J.A. 127.  Defendants argue the substantive due process right 
the grand jury identified—“the right to localized travel on 
public roadways free from restrictions unrelated to legitimate 
government objectives”—is not clearly established and thus 
cannot form the basis of the civil rights offenses charged in 
Counts 8 and 9.   
 
Defendants’ attack on the sufficiency of Counts 8 and 9 
of the indictment is a legal question over which our review is 
plenary.  See Willis, 844 F.3d at 161 n.7.  “[W]hether the 
alleged violation of substantive due process was clearly 
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established . . . is a question of law over which our review is 
unrestricted.”  Mammaro v. N.J. Div. of Child Protection & 
Permanency, 814 F.3d 164, 168 (3d Cir. 2016). 
 
Section 241 makes it a crime for “two or more persons 
[to] conspire to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any 
person in any State, Territory, Commonwealth, Possession, or 
District in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or 
privilege secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the 
United States,” and Section 242 makes it a crime for a person 
“under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or 
custom, to willfully subject[] any person in any State, 
Territory, Commonwealth, Possession, or District to the 
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured or 
protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States.” 18 
U.S.C. §§ 241–42. 
 
“[I]n lieu of describing the specific conduct it forbids, 
each statute’s general terms incorporate constitutional law by 
reference.”  United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 265 (1997).  
The statutes’ scope is limited to “rights fairly warned of, 
having been ‘made specific’ by the time of the charged 
conduct.”  Id. at 267.  The Supreme Court has held that “the 
object of the ‘clearly established’ immunity standard is not 
different from that of ‘fair warning’ as it relates to law ‘made 
specific’ for the purpose of validly applying” the criminal civil 
rights statutes.  Id. at 270.  Accordingly, we apply the same test 
as in qualified immunity cases, asking whether the right 
allegedly deprived was clearly established.  See id. 
 
Before trial, Defendants moved to dismiss the 
indictment, arguing that there is no constitutional right to 
localized travel on public roadways and that, even if such a 
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right did exist, it had not yet been clearly established.  As the 
District Court noted when denying the motion, our Court 
recognized a Fourteenth Amendment due process right to 
intrastate travel nearly three decades ago.  See Lutz v. City of 
York, 899 F.2d 255, 268–70 (3d Cir. 1990).  Specifically, in 
reviewing a city ordinance that prohibited cars from driving 
three or more times through certain overcrowded streets during 
evening hours, see id. at 257, we held there is “[a] due process 
right of localized movement on the public roadways,” id. at 
269, which we alternately described as “the right to move 
freely about one’s neighborhood or town, even by 
automobile,” id. at 268.  We further held no other constitutional 
provision could provide the source of the right.  See id. at 262–
68 (rejecting Article IV Privileges and Immunities Clause, 
Fourteenth Amendment Privileges or Immunities Clause, 
rights of national citizenship, Commerce Clause, and 
Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause theories).  We 
nonetheless upheld the ordinance because it was narrowly 
tailored to meet the significant city objectives of protecting 
public safety and reducing intense traffic congestion.  Id. at 
270. 
 
Contrary to the District Court’s holding, however, and 
according to the Supreme Court’s qualified immunity 
precedent, Lutz alone could not have put Defendants on notice 
that they were violating a constitutional right.  “A Government 
official’s conduct violates clearly established law when, at the 
time of the challenged conduct, ‘the contours of a right are 
sufficiently clear’ that every ‘reasonable official would have 
understood that what he is doing violates that right.’”  L.R. v. 
Sch. Dist. of Phila., 836 F.3d 235, 248 (3d Cir. 2016) (quoting 
Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011)).  “To determine 
whether the right is clearly established, we look at the state of 
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the law when the [conduct] occurred,” Fields v. City of Phila., 
862 F.3d 353, 361 (3d Cir. 2017), here 2013.  The Supreme 
Court has suggested that a single binding case from the 
defendant’s jurisdiction is insufficient to give notice that 
certain conduct could lead to criminal punishment.  See Carroll 
v. Carman, 135 S. Ct. 348, 350 (2014).  Instead, “[w]e look 
first to applicable Supreme Court precedent.”  L.R., 836 F.3d 
at 247–48.  A relevant Supreme Court holding ends the inquiry.  
“[I]f none exists, it may be possible that a ‘robust consensus of 
cases of persuasive authority’ in the Court[s] of Appeals could 
clearly establish a right for purposes of qualified immunity.”  
Id. at 248 (quoting Mammaro, 814 F.3d at 169). 
 
The Supreme Court has never recognized an intrastate 
travel right.  Far from a “robust consensus” in the Courts of 
Appeals that the right exists, the law across the circuits is 
uncertain.  And most often our sister circuits have considered 
the matter in reviewing challenges to municipal residency 
requirements, not government action prohibiting free 
movement in public spaces, undermining the notice those 
opinions might have provided to Defendants as to the criminal 
nature of their conduct. 
 
In addition to our opinion in Lutz,19 the First, Second, 
and Sixth Circuits have recognized a right to intrastate travel, 
though they have described it at varying levels of generality.  
See Cole v. Hous. Auth. of City of Newport, 435 F.2d 807, 809 
                                              
19 We earlier recognized the right in Wellford v. Battaglia, 485 
F.2d 1151, 1152 (3d Cir. 1973) (per curiam), where we struck 
down a durational residency requirement for mayoral 
candidates because it burdened potential candidates’ 
fundamental “right to travel.” 
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(1st Cir. 1970) (striking down city’s two-year durational 
residency requirement for low-income housing on equal 
protection grounds for violating the “right to travel”); King v. 
New Rochelle Mun. Hous. Auth., 442 F.2d 646, 648–49 (2d Cir. 
1971) (striking down five-year durational residency 
requirement for admission to municipality’s public housing on 
equal protection grounds for violating a “right to travel within 
a state”); Johnson v. City of Cincinnati, 310 F.3d 484, 495, 
502–05 (6th Cir. 2002) (favorably citing Lutz to hold a city 
ordinance banning persons convicted of drug crimes from 
“drug-exclusion zones” violated the due process “right to 
travel locally through public spaces and roadways”).20 
 
On the other hand, the Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, 
and Tenth Circuits have treated the question more skeptically, 
often hesitating to recognize a due process intrastate travel 
right and sometimes explicitly rejecting theories rooted in 
other constitutional provisions.  See Eldridge v. Bouchard, 645 
F. Supp. 749, 753–55 (W.D. Va. 1986) (rejecting challenge to 
regional salary differential for police officers, in part, because 
“the plaintiffs do not have a federally recognized fundamental 
right to intrastate travel” rooted in the Privileges or Immunities 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, though suggesting an 
intrastate travel right may be implicated in durational residency 
cases), aff’d, 823 F.2d 546 (4th Cir. 1987); Qutb v. Strauss, 11 
F.3d 488, 492 (5th Cir. 1993) (upholding juvenile curfew 
ordinance even “assum[ing] without deciding that the right to 
move about freely [in public] is a fundamental right,” noting 
                                              
20 The Government cites Cole v. City of Memphis, 839 F.3d 530 
(6th Cir. 2016), as also recognizing the right, but this case post-
dates the conduct at issue and could not have provided fair 
notice here.  See Fields, 862 F.3d at 361.  
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“under certain circumstances, minors may be treated 
differently from adults”); Wright v. City of Jackson, 506 F.2d 
900, 903–04 (5th Cir. 1975) (upholding fire department’s 
continual residency requirement because it offended no 
fundamental right to intrastate travel); Andre v. Bd. of Trustees 
of Vill. of Maywood, 561 F.2d 48, 53 (7th Cir. 1977) (declining 
to “consider whether a right of intrastate travel should be 
acknowledged” because town’s new continual residency 
requirement for public employment was not durational); 
Townes v. City of St. Louis, 949 F. Supp. 731, 735–36 (E.D. 
Mo. 1996) (holding ordinance blocking access to one city 
intersection to reduce crime would not violate due process 
intrastate travel right, assuming it exists), aff’d, 112 F.3d 514 
(8th Cir. 1997); D.L. v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 497, 596 F.3d 
768, 776 (10th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (rejecting substantive 
due process challenge to school district’s continual residency 
requirement because “the constitutional rights at issue apply 
only to interstate travel, and the travel that Plaintiffs claim was 
restricted was intrastate travel”). 
 
The D.C. Circuit is internally conflicted but has not yet 
set precedent.  A plurality of the Court sitting en banc 
suggested a due process right to intrastate travel might exist but 
did not reach the question.  See Hutchins v. D.C., 188 F.3d 531, 
538 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (en banc) (plurality opinion) 
(acknowledging “a hypothetical municipal restriction on the 
movement of its citizens, for example, a draconian curfew, 
might bring into play the concept of substantive due process,” 
but declining to find a fundamental right implicated by a 
juvenile curfew ordinance, in part because juveniles do not 
have the same rights as adults).  In separate opinions, another 
plurality concluded a right to intrastate travel exists and ought 
to be subject to intermediate scrutiny.  See id. at 553 n.1 
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(Rogers, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (listing 
views expressed by each presiding judge on the “fundamental 
right to movement”). 
 
Simply put, although four circuits (including our own) 
have found some form of a constitutional right to intrastate 
travel, there is hardly a “robust consensus” that the right exists, 
let alone clarity as to its contours.  Although Lutz is both clear 
and binding in our jurisdiction, this area of law as a whole is 
far from settled.  Based on the Supreme Court’s qualified 
immunity precedent, we hold the District Court erred in 
concluding Lutz, standing alone, provided fair warning that 
Defendants conduct was illegal, especially in view of the state 
of the law in our sister circuits.  See Carroll, 135 S. Ct. at 351.  
“[W]hether or not the constitutional rule applied by the court 
below was correct, it was not ‘beyond debate.’”  Id. at 352 
(quoting Stanton v. Sims, 571 U.S. 3, 10–11 (2013) (per 
curiam)). 
 
Accordingly, we will reverse and vacate Defendants’ 
civil rights convictions and remand with instructions to dismiss 
Counts 8 and 9 of the indictment under Federal Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 12(b).  See Cicco, 938 F.2d at 446–47.  
Because we reverse and vacate Defendants’ convictions, we 
need not reach their arguments concerning the jury instructions 
on the civil rights counts. 
 
VI. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm Defendants’ 
judgments of convictions as to the wire fraud and Section 666 
counts (Counts 1 through 7), and we will reverse and vacate 
only as to the civil rights counts (Counts 8 and 9).  Because we 
Case: 17-1818     Document: 003113094594     Page: 76      Date Filed: 11/27/2018
77 
 
have reversed and vacated two counts of the indictment, we 
will vacate Defendants’ sentences on the remaining counts of 
convictions.21  We will remand with instructions to dismiss 
                                              
21 The Supreme Court has explained that resentencing is 
appropriate where Defendants successfully appeal some but 
not all of the counts of conviction: 
 
[Sentencing package] cases typically involve 
multicount indictments and a successful attack 
by a defendant on some but not all of the counts 
of conviction. The appeals court, in such 
instances, may vacate the entire sentence on all 
counts so that, on remand, the trial court can 
reconfigure the sentencing plan to ensure that it 
remains adequate to satisfy the sentencing 
factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). In remanded 
cases, the Government relates, trial courts have 
imposed a sentence on the remaining 
counts longer than the sentence originally 
imposed on those particular counts, but yielding 
an aggregate sentence no longer than the 
aggregate sentence initially imposed. Thus the 
defendant ultimately may gain nothing from his 
limited success on appeal, but he will also lose 
nothing, as he will serve no more time than the 
trial court originally ordered. 
 
Greenlaw v. United States, 554 U.S. 237, 253–54 
(2008) (citations omitted); United States v. Hodge, 870 
F.3d 184, 188 (3d Cir. 2017) (remanding “for requisite 
resentencing” where some, but not all, counts of 
convictions were vacated). 
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only Counts 8 and 9 of the indictment and to resentence 
Defendants on the remaining counts of conviction. 
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